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Abstract 
As the stock market came to the attention of increasing numbers of physicists, an idea 
that has recently emerged is that it might be possible to develop a mathematical theory 
of stock market crashes. This thesis is primarily concerned with statistical aspects of such 
a theory. 
Chapters 1-5 discuss simple models for bubbles. Chapter 1 is an introduction. Chapter 2 
describes a skeleton exploratory analysis, before discussing some economic interpretations 
of crashes and a rational expectations model of financial crashes - a slightly simplified 
version of that in {52}. This model assumes that economic variables undergo a phase 
transition prior to a crash, and we give some empirical support of this idea in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
Chapter 3 discusses SDE models for bubbles. We describe maximum likelihood estimation 
of the model of {94} and refine previous estimation of this model in {2}. Further, we 
extend this model using a heavy-tailed hyperbolic process, {34}, to provide a robust 
statistical test for bubbles. In Chapter 4 we examine a range of volatility and liquidity 
precursors. We have some evidence that crashes occur on volatile illiquid markets and 
economic interpretation of our results appears interesting. Chapter 5 synthesises Chapters 
2-4. 
In Chapter 6 we develop calculations in {55}, to derive a generalised Pareto distribution for 
drawdowns. In addition, we review a method of using power-laws to distinguish between 
endogenous and exogenous origins of crises {100}. Despite some evidence to support the 
original approach, it appears that a better model is a stochastic volatility model where 
the log volatility is fractional Gaussian noise. 
{6} makes a distinction between insurance crisis and illiquidity crisis models. In Chapter 
7, focusing upon illiquidity crises, we apply the method of {71} to evaluate contagion 
in economics. Chapter 8 summarises the main findings and gives suggestions for further 
work. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to build towards a mathematical theory of financial crashes. The 
first chapter is essentially a summary and a review of relevant aspects of statistical physics 
models in finance, particularly log-periodic models {93}. Chapter 2 will demonstrate 
that simpler models will suffice, before additional models are developed in Chapters 3-4. 
Statistical models and tests for bubbles are synthesised in Chapter 5. 
Chapters 6 and 7 are intended to provide further additions to such a theory. Chapter 6 
discusses power laws for drawdowns [55], and power laws for volatility decay associated 
with external/internal shocks {100]. In Chapter 7 we discuss, based primarily upon [71], 
Chapter 6, statistical approaches to evaluating contagion in economics. 
The particular aim of this chapter is to provide a general introduction to one of the main 
themes of this thesis - the application of ideas from physics and complex systems in 
economics and finance. We discuss this in more detail in the next section. Of particular 
interest are possible applications of statistical mechanics and self-organized criticality. We 
motivate these considerations further with an !sing-type model of financial crashes. For 
monograph treatments of statistical mechanics and self-organized criticality, we refer to 
{44] and (50]. 
Key to the application of physics techniques in finance have been a number of statistical 
physicists essentially using financial markets as a testing ground for a range of models 
describing a large number of independent units with nonlinear interactions [75]. It 
is largely considerations along these lines which have motivated the highly contentious 
subject of log-periodic precursors to financial crashes {98]. This was originally motivated 
by modelling of acoustic emissions - stress waves produced by the sudden internal stress 
redistribution of materials caused by changes in their internal structure - in relation to 
destructive testing of kevlar tanks (4]. The intuition here is that complex systems may 
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exhibit universal "fingerprints" prior to failure. This is due to an analogy with statistical 
mechanics, discrete scale invariance, and a hypothesised universal fibre-bundle mechanism. 
We discuss log-periodicity and log-periodic models in Section 3. In Section 4, we apply 
these models to real data. Section 5 is a summary. 
1.1 Introduction to physics and complexity in finance 
According to [38}, physics has traditionally been defined as the study of matter and 
energy and the interaction between these two complementary concepts. However, both 
the analytical tools and underlying empirical outlook can be applied to non-traditional 
areas. As a result the influence of physicists and physical ideas has gone beyond traditional 
boundaries. Consequently there has been a great deal of interest among physicists in 
economics and this has lead to the emergence of the so-called field of "econophysics" . For 
a monograph treatment see [22}. 
There are two major reasons for this development. One factor is the thawing of the 
cold war, leading to decreased funding opportunities for research into traditional areas of 
physics. However, another important reason is that the areas of finance and physics can be 
said to share broadly the same aims, namely, matching theory with empirical observation. 
This is in contrast to the purely empirical nature of some statistical models. [38} describes 
a process of cross-fertilization between economics and physics. One of the most prominent 
examples of this is Bachelier's famous doctoral thesis of 1900, which used Brownian motion 
as a model of the Paris stock exchange. It is also interesting to note that Fisher Black 
- of Black-Scholes fame - was originally a physicist [75}. However, there are some key 
differences between economics and physics. Much of physics is concerned with building a 
body of theory that is capable of being tested by observation or experimentation. However, 
this feature does not translate particularly well to economics as a whole. Firstly, [38} 
describes economics as typically being quite data poor, with finance a notable exception. 
Secondly, human beings are not inanimate and are immensely complicated. Describing this 
behaviour mathematically is challenging, and various approaches to tackling this problem 
are also discussed in [38]. 
This process of cross-fertilisation continued in the 1960s with the publication of a milestone 
paper by the French mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot [73]. Here, for the first time, the 
assumption of Gaussian distributed price variations was rejected - in favour of the heavier 
tailed a stable or Levy stable laws. Today there has been a proliferation of Levy type 
models in the mainstream financial literature, see for instance [31}, with these models 
not restricted to the stable processes originally considered. Meanwhile, continued work 
by Mandelbrot and others brought attention to possible features of scale invariance and 
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power-laws in price dynamics [72}. However, the comment is made in [12} that such 
apparent scaling in finance could simply be an artefact of naturally occurring semi-heavy 
tails. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an immense growth in the world's financial 
markets, and also an increased level of automatisation. The result was vast amounts 
of readily available financial data. This attracted the increasing attention of statistical 
physicists, interested both in the empirical statistics of financial time series and also 
in applying novel nonlinear methods. These nonlinear models attempt to model 
large numbers of units, subject to (usually very simple) interactions. Alongside the 
application of these nonlinear models to markets, strong analogies became apparent 
between speculative markets and statistical physics, especially features such as universality, 
spin systems, self-organized criticality and complexity. For details and references we refer 
to the discussion in [75}. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to give a rigorous mathematical definition of what exactly 
constitutes a complex system as no such definition is thought to exist. Typically, what is 
meant by a complex system is a system governed by relatively simple - usually nonlinear 
-equations. However, these equations can exhibit rich behaviour on temporal and spatial 
scales, that is not explicitly contained in the system's constituent parts nor their associated 
equations. Non-trivial collective phenomena can emerge from a series of seemingly trivial 
interactions between single components. 
According to [75} it is not difficult to identify indicators for nonlinearity - and hence the 
use of complex systems - in finance. These include incidence of speculative bubbles, 
financial crashes, panic, etc. Also apparent are signs of universal features, with the 
existence of a number of remarkably consistent stylized empirical facts about financial 
markets, which have been observed over a wide range of asset types and across different 
time scales Cont and Tankov, Chapter 7, page 210. With regard to bubbles and crashes, 
there is an important class of so-called autocatalytic processes, whereby small stimuli can 
be strongly amplified by means of the internal dynamics of the system. Also important 
here is the concept of self-organized criticality, whereby the nonlinear interactions of a 
system can place the system in an almost permanent critical state. 
1.2 The analogy with Statistical Physics 
Recall that we have defined a complex system, somewhat loosely, as a system whose 
macroscopic behaviour is governed by a multitude of microscopic (usually nonlinear) 
interactions. Further, recall that (roughly speaking) statistical mechanics is the study 
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of how macroscopic properties emerge from a series of microscopic interactions. There are 
some classical statistical mechanics systems in (thermal) equilibrium which can be solved 
exactly. A key example here is the 2-d !sing model in the presence of zero magnetic field 
[76}, [15]. However, this is very much the exception. It is more often the case that even 
when analyzing models in thermal equilibrium an exact solution cannot be found and 
practical analysis centres around more informal techniques like Monte-Carlo simulation, 
mean field theory and epsilon (series) expansions [107}. Useful introductory treatments 
of statistical mechanics are given by [44] and [107]. We explore the extension from these 
classical statistical models to complicated real world systems, like stock markets, which are 
far from equilibrium. We assume that these systems will share some general features, such 
as the emergence of power laws as an indication of co-operative phenomena for example. 
A mathematical exposition of these types of ideas is given by [48]. 
Two key features make the comparison between stock markets and some statistical 
mechanics models pertinent. Firstly, the notion from statistical mechanics of macroscopic 
behaviour emerging from the small-scale interactions. Secondly, phase transitions in 
statistical mechanics. In thermodynamics, a phase transition occurs when there is a 
singularity in the free energy or one of its derivatives in some thermodynamic system 
[107}, page 1. Typically, one sees a visibly sharp change in the properties of the system 
such as a transformation from liquid to gas. However, the notion of phase transitions is not 
restricted solely to change of state. Yeomans gives an example where the magnetization 
of beta-brass is affected by the ordering of zinc and copper atoms in a molecular lattice. 
Moreover, there are (applied probability rather than physics) papers on phase transitions 
in social networks [47} and computer information networks [74]. These articles are 
perhaps best viewed as describing the collective phenomena that emerge as the result of 
numerous and very complicated interactions between people. It is precisely this feature 
that we seek to model. An introduction to possible physical applications in social sciences 
is given by [9]. 
In this thesis, the key idea is to model a stock market crash as occurring when there is 
a disorder-order transition from a roughly equal mix of buyers and sellers to a situation 
whereby the number of sellers outweighs the number of buyers. Here there is a striking 
metaphor with the physical phenomenon of ferromagnetism. Ferromagnetic materials can 
exhibit spontaneous magnetisation in the absence of an applied external field. As the 
temperature is lowered past the (critical) Curie temperature Tc, magnetic spins which can 
take the values ±1 align in the same direction. The net result is magnetisation which 
occurs spontaneously, and in the absence of an applied field. Informally, if we imagine 
agents on a stock market taking the values + 1 meaning sell and -1 meaning buy, we can 
imagine a crash occurring when all the agent spins spontaneously co-ordinate themselves 
to align in a +1 position. Realising that the price cannot rise any further, agents place 
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sell orders at the same time, and the price plummets. 
Here, we discuss the Cont-Bouchaud percolation model {30}. Our aim is motivate 
physical models incorporating large numbers of microscopic interactions. The account 
here is also based on that in {85}, Chapter 5, and /22}, Chapter 20. According 
to Paul and Baschangel purely statistical fluctuations govern a stable market when 
supply and demand are well tempered. However, the situation is more complicated 
prior to a crash when an immense number of traders sell spontaneously. According to 
this interpretation, crashes are triggered by the spontaneous development of long-range 
correlations between market traders. Thus understanding crashes, and perhaps more 
general financial fluctuations, necessitates an understanding of traders' behaviour and 
leads naturally to models incorporating a large number of microscopic interactions. 
Let P(t) denote the price at timet. Consider a market of N microscopic traders of identical 
size. At time, t + 1, trader i can buy (</>i = 1), sell (<l>i = -1), or remain inactive (</>i = 0). 
In this model, the difference between supply and demand is given by the sum of all the 
<l>i· It is assumed that the price change is proportional to this difference between supply 
and demand: 
1 N 
ilP(t + 1) = ~L4>i(t + 1), 
i=l 
(1.1) 
where t:lP(t+1) = P(t+1)-P(t) and>. is a measure of how sensitive the market prices are 
to variations in supply and demand /85}, Chapter 6. Suppose all traders in the market can 
'communicate' with each other in some way. This communication may make two traders 
adopt a common market position - i.e. they both decide to buy, sell, or be inactive. If 
this happens, we say that a 'bond' is created between the traders. The creation of such a 
bond should happen with a small probability: 
b 
Pb= N' 
since any trader can bind to any other, and the average number of bonds per trader is 
(N - 1 )Pb· Thus, Pb is determined by a single parameter b, which characterises the rate 
at which traders comply with each other. Thus the N traders are divided at random 
into 'clusters' of inter-connected traders. These clusters in effect act as one large trader, 
linking as they do traders who trade identically. The decision of each cluster is assumed 
independent of its size, and also the decisions taken by other clusters so that Se and </>e in 
(1.2) are assumed to be independent. 
Let <l>e(t + 1) denote the state of cluster cat time t + 1. If there are Ne clusters in total, 
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and Se denotes the size of each cluster, then (1.1) can be re-written as 
1 Ne 
AP(t + 1) = )."L SecPe(t + 1). 
c=l 
(1.2) 
Thus, we see from (1.2) that the distribution of AP(t+1) is determined by the distribution 
Pe(S) of the group sizes se. However, the distribution of the group size is well known in 
percolation theory as the cluster-size distribution of an infinite-range bond percolation 
model, a classical problem {101]: 
( ) 1 -(1-b2 )s Pc s I'V s1+3/2 e (1 << s << N), (1.3) 
if b $ 1. In this case the price changes axe approximately given by 
1 Ne 
AP(t + 1) = )." LPe(s)c/le(t + 1), 
c=l 
(1.4) 
where the Pe(s) in (1.4) refer to random draws from the distribution in (1.3) and the 
cPe(t + 1)'s are an i.i.d. sequence of random variables taking the values { -1, 0, 1} with 
probabilities {a, 1- 2a, a} independent of the Pe(s). (Here, we have assumed that 1- 2a 
is the probability that a given cluster is inactive at timet+ 1, and that each given cluster 
buys or sells with probability a). b = 1 corresponds to a so-called percolation threshold. In 
this case (1.3) becomes a power law with exponent 3/2 {pe(s)I'Vs-1- 312), and [22] states 
that in this case the central limit theorem for non-Normal random variables applies so 
that for large Ne the distribution of the price increment approaches a symmetric Stable 
distribution with index J.L = 3/2. If b < 1, (1.3) shows that the variance of the Pc(s) exists. 
So in this case, the usual central limit theorem applies and the distribution of the price 
increments approaches a Gaussian. If b > 1, increasing numbers of traders join a spanning 
cluster which dominates this system. This situation corresponds to a crash. Thus, this 
simple model is intended to provide a plausible and basic mechanism generating heavy-
tailed distributions and crashes in financial maxkets. 
According to {85] there is some suggestion of self-organized criticality, with some internal 
market dynamics permanently maintaining b around 1 meaning that the market is 
preserved at an almost critical state. This is the essence of self-organized criticality {50}. 
{22] make some criticisms of this model. Firstly, this model is static and cannot describe 
how the clustering of agents evolves over time. Secondly, there is a discrepancy between 
the derived power law with exponent J.L = 3/2, and the empirically observed J.LI'V3, There 
is a vast literature regaxding so-called agent-based models. Some useful introductory 
references are given at the end of Chapter 20 in {22}. 
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1.3 Log-periodic models in finance 
1.3.1 Log-periodicity 
Log-periodicity occurs in connection with the functional equation f(J..Ls) = f(s), where J..L is 
a real constant. Solutions to this equation are known variously as multiplicatively periodic 
or logarithmically periodic, the function f being periodic after a logarithmic change of 
argument. Letting g(x) = f(ex), we can see that 
g (logs) = g (log(J..Ls)) 
= g (log J..L + log s) , 
so g is periodic in the usual sense with period log(J..L). Log-periodicity occurs naturally 
within the context of fractals and branching processes, see for example {16}. Many fractals 
or approximate fractals in applied sciences are created by a recursive procedure. The 
passage from the nth stage to then+ 1 th stage of the approximating pre-fractal corresponds 
to the transition of the nth generation to the n + 1 th generation of a branching process. 
This also corresponds naturally, in a more concrete setting, to models with a hierarchical 
structure. In the context of finance, such a hierarchical structure might imply cascades of 
information from a global level to a local level, i.e. from the top downwards. 
The search for log-periodicity in real-world systems was motivated by the study of phase 
transitions {38}. The proto-typical example of a phase transition is the simple ferromagnet 
which consists of magnetic spins, each of which can take the value ±1. In most solids, these 
spins are disordered and cancel out in aggregate, so as to produce zero net magnetization. 
However, in a ferromagnet, the spins can spontaneously align to produce a nonzero 
aggregate magnetization. There is thus a phase transition to an ordered (magnetised) 
state from a disordered (not magnetised) state. 
The magnetic susceptibility of a magnetic system is defined as 
8M 
x=-8B 
B=O 
where M is the magnetisation and B is the magnitude of an external magnetic field. The 
susceptibility of the ferromagnet follows a power law for temperatures T > Tc: 
x(T) = (T- TcY:t, (1.5) 
where a < 0, and Tc is the critical (Curie) temperature which was briefly introduced in 
the previous section {38}. This power law can be attributed to the continuous scaling 
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symmetry of the underlying lattice. The spins can be grouped into blocks of spins, each 
of which corresponds to a composite spin equal to the sum of the spins in the block. 
Feigenbaum states that, according to renormalization group theory, we can find a model 
involving interactions between these composite spins that replicates properties of the true 
model {45}. Scaling symmetry and the power law behaviour in (1.5) emerge as a result 
of the fact that the macroscopic predictions of the block model do not depend on the 
size of the blocks. (Ignoring finite size effects of spins (atoms), we can rescale the blocks 
arbitrarily.) 
Feigenbaum states that similar considerations carry through in a magnetic system that 
exhibits a discrete scaling symmetry. The system remains unchanged only if we rescale by 
integer powers of some length scale. Feigenbaum gives the example of a Sierpinski gasket 
as an object with discrete scaling symmetry. Discrete scaling symmetry is less restrictive 
than continuous scaling symmetry, and the exponent of the power law is generalized and 
can now be complex: 
where a< 0 and(} is real. The magnetic susceptibility thus satisfies 
x(T) = (T- Tc) 0 [Re (exp(i8ln(T- Tc)))] 
= (T- Tc)0 [cos(8ln(T- Tc))]. 
(1.6) 
(1. 7) 
According to Feigenbaum, the recognition that discrete scale invariance could lead to 
log-periodicity led to a search for log-periodicity in the natural world. Rupture events, 
like earthquakes, were found to be a very fruitful source of log-periodic oscillations [90}. 
Stock market crashes have also been likened to a rupture event. There is an analogy here 
between the formation of microcracks and a spread of pessimism in the market place. A 
pessimistic trader going against the trend is like an isolated microcrack in a solid. When 
these microcracks reach a critical density, they combine, and the result is a catastrophic 
failure. As a result of the search for log-periodicity in the real world, possible indications 
of log-periodicity in finance were found independently by [41] and [98}. 
Continuing the discussion along physical lines, there is a suggestion of a seemingly universal 
structure behind these so-called rupture events. According to Feigenbaum, the hypothesis 
is that each of these systems exhibiting ruptures have a fibre-bundle-like structure with 
discrete scale invariance. The system contains N fibres, each of which contains N smaller 
fibres etc. Rupture may then be seen to correspond to a phase transition, from a connected 
to a disconnected state, and it is anticipated that certain variables may then display log-
periodic oscillations by analogy with the susceptibility in (1. 7). 
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We discuss log-periodic models used in finance in subsections 3 and 4. The advantage of 
these models is that they enable one to make predictions under what are anticipated to be 
rather general circumstances. This practical aspect should not be understated. However, 
one of the key themes of this thesis is that these log-periodic models actually prove to 
be rather ill-equipped as financial models which have to be estimated statistically, and it 
seems that somewhat simpler methods will suffice. 
1.3.2 Simple Power Law model 
In the canonical 2-d !sing model, as the temperature T approaches the critical point Tc, 
the magnetization M goes to zero as 
where /3=1/8. [70}, page 233, describes this kind of behaviour as being quite general for 
critical phenomena. Given this generality of power-law type behaviour, a reasonable first 
order approximation suggests fitting the following model to the log-price y(t): 
y(t) = A+ B(tc- t)a + ft, (1.8) 
where A and B are constants and ft is a zero-mean error term. This model simply predicts 
an explosive power law growth prior to the crash. 
1.3.3 Simple log-periodic fracture model 
The argument here follows that in [4}. Consider a mechanical system under strain. Let 
dE f dt be the instantaneous energy rate of mechanical waves in the system, as a function 
of the applied internal pressure p up to the rupture threshold Pr· Let x = (p - Pr ), 
and set F(x) = (dE(x)fdt)- 1. By the phase transition analogy, we anticipate that the 
instantaneous energy rate becomes infinite precisely when the system fails. Thus we are 
left with F(x) = 0 precisely when x = 0. By the analogy with a statistical mechanical 
system, we assume that we have a generic scaling relation 
JLF(x) = F(lj>(x)), (1.9) 
for some real constant IL and 4>( ·) a differentiable function known as the flow map. By 
(1.9) and the considerations above, we have that 4>(0) = 0. Expanding 4> up to first order 
in a Taylor series, we obtain if>(x) = >.x + O(x2). This approximation is made for the sake 
of tractability but, since we are concerned with x small corresponding to the region of 
the rupture threshold, this may be physically reasonable. Under the linear approximation 
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<f>(x) = .Xx we obtain the functional equation for log-periodicity: 
J.LF(x) = F(.Xx). (1.10) 
It can easily be verified that a solution to (1.10) is given by the simple power-law 
Fo(x) = x'", where a= log(J.L)/log(.X). The general solution to (1.10) is 
F(x) = Fo(x)p(log(Fo(x))), (1.11) 
where p(x) is a periodic function of x, with period log(J.L) [4}, and is also without any 
zeros since by assumption F(x) = 0 precisely when x = 0. Since p(x) is periodic, so is 
1/p(x), and this can be expanded in a Fourier series. Since we are only interested in x ~ 0, 
corresponding to the time up to and including rupture, it is sufficient to assume that both 
p(x) and 1/p(x) are even functions of x, and we can arrive at the series expansion 
1 f: ( 2mr log(x)) 
p(log(Fo(x))) = n=O an cos log( .X) , (1.12) 
since lo~Jl) = log(>.). Retaining only the first order term in (1.12), we obtain 
1 ( (211'log(x))) 
p(log(Fo(x))) = ao + a1cos log(.X) . (1.13) 
In order to find an expression for dEjdt(x), we invert our expression for F(x) in (1.11) to 
obtain 
(1.14) 
where B = a0 and C = atfao. The form taken by (1.14) is assumed to be very general 
and, in anticipation of a "universal" log-periodic acceleration, dE/ dt is identified with the 
derivative of the log-price y(t). In practice, as a pragmatic step, a phase constant </> is 
added to compensate for the change of units between x and tc [28}. This leaves us with 
dyjdt = B(tc- t)-o (1 + C cos (w log(tc- t) + </>)), (1.15) 
where w = 211'/log(.X). Now the function 
f(t) = H (tc- t) 1 -~'[1 + F2 cos(w ln(tc- t) + </>) + F3 sin(w ln(tc- t) + </> )], (1.16) 
has derivative 
/'(t) = -(1- "f)Fl(tc- t)-1' 
x [1 + F2cos(wln(tc- t) + </>) + F3sin(wln(tc- t) + </>)] 
+ wF1 (tc- t)-~'[F2 sin(w ln(tc- t) + </>)- F3 cos(w ln(tc- t) + </>)]. 
11 
Equating coefficients, we see that this can be rewritten in the form 
f'(t) = -F{ (tc- t)-1 [1 + F~ cos(w ln(tc- t) + <P) +Fa sin(w ln(tc - t) + <P)], 
where 
Fl 1 = (1- 1)F1, 
F~ w = F2+ -1-F3, 
-I' 
p.l w 
= F3---F2. 3 1-1' 
These relations can be trivially inverted to give 
F1 = F{ 
1- /'' 
1 [ 1 W 1] 
F2 = (_.!!:!.__) 2 F2 - 1 - /' F3 ' 
1 + 1--y 
1 [ 1 W 1] F3 = (_.!!:!.__) 2 F3 + 1 - /' F2 . 
1 + 1-')' 
Thus, by setting F{ = -B,F~ = C,F3 = 0 we can see that the solution to (1.15) takes the 
form of (1.16) with F1 = 1-.!,F2 = 1+(~)2C,F3 = 1+(~)2 k~'aP]· This allows us to 
1-Q 1-Q 
write 
y(t) =A+ 1-_~ (tc- t)l-o [ 1 + F2 ( cos(w ln(tc- t) + <P) + 1 ~0 sin(w ln(tc- t) + <P)) J . 
We perform a trick used in {28} which enables some simplification. If we set () = 
tan-1 ( 1~0 ), the trigonometric terms in the round brackets can then be written as 
cos(O) cos(w ln(tc- t) + <P) + sin(O) sin(w ln(tc- t) + <P) 
cos(O) 
Rearranging, using the trigonometric formula cos( A- B) =cos( A) cos(B) +sin( A) sin( B), 
this can be seen to be equal to 
cos (w ln(tc- t) + <P- 8) 
cos(8) 
These considerations lead to the log-price being proportional to the functional form given 
in (1.16) with F3 = 0. Thus we are led to the following model for the log-price y(t): 
(1.17) 
where A, B, C, tc, </J, w, o are constants independent of timet with B = 1-_! and C = c:re). 
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1.3.4 Sornette-Johansen nonlinear log-periodic model 
This section deals mainly with the Sornette-Johansen nonlinear log-periodic formula 
which is fitted to log-prices. The method takes the view that the form of (1.17) is 
a reasonable approximation, but seeks a simple refinement to increase the accuracy 
of the original model. The intention is to build a model which, under generic but 
largely phenomenological considerations, better accounts for the underlying oscillations 
of financial and physical reality. The methodology is contained in (96}, and builds on an 
analogy with Landau expansions in second-order phase transitions in physics. This theory 
assumes analyticity in the vicinity of a critical point (see for example (66]). For instance, 
the thermodynamic potential <I> of a uniform sample of a pure substance at constant 
temperature is modelled by an analytic function of temperature T and the square T/ of the 
order of the sample1 , so that 
(1.18) 
where At(T)"" (T- Tc) as T--+Tc,A2 > O,a > 0 and Tc is the transition temperature of 
the substance. For discussion related to the appropriate physical context we must refer 
to (66}, Chapter XIV. It is the series expansion in (1.18), and the underlying assumption 
of analyticity in the vicinity of the critical point, that motivates the method considered 
here. The first model considered the functional equation 
J-LF(x) = F(>-.x), (1.19) 
which generates log-periodicity. A simple solution to this functional equation is the power 
law F(x) = xa, where a:= ~~~X· Such a power law relationship can also be generated from 
the equation 
dF(x) 
d(log(x)) = o:F(x). (1.20) 
In order to generalise (1.20), Sornette and Johnansen consider 
(1.21) 
which is assumed to constitute a second-order series expansion with (1.20) the 
corresponding first-order condition. In the sequel we identify x with tc - t. We write 
F(x) = B(x)eit/Jx, and consider the modulus and argument parts separately. We can 
1Thermodynamic potentials are parameters of a thermodynamic system which have the dimensions of 
energy, such as the internal energy or the Helmholtz free energy. The order of a sample takes the values 0 
and 1 corresponding to disordered and ordered states. 
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derive the following pair of differential equations 
8B 
8(log(x)) 
81/J 
8(log(x)) 
Sornette and Johansen give the solution to this set of differential equations as 
1/J = w log(x/xo) + B5 2: log(! + (xfxo)
20 ). 
(1.22) 
(1.23) 
(1.24) 
(1.25) 
Here Bo =o:/1} , and xo is an arbitrary constant. If we retain solely the real parts, the 
solution for F(x) is given by 
F(x) = Bo (x/xoYl: cos[wlog(x/xo) + B5
2
K- log(l + (x/xo)20)]. (1.26) J! + (x/xo)2a a 
This suggests the following pragmatic generalisation of ( 1.17) {96]: 
y(t) = A+B (tc- t)a [l+Ccos[wlog(tc-t)+ .£l
2
wlog(l + ((tc- t)/.llt)20 )+4>]], 
vfl + ((tc- t)j.£lt)2a 0: 
(1.27) 
with the trigonometric formula (1.25) correcting first-order behaviour of the form y(t) = 
A+ B tc-t a 
2 
• However, it appears that there may be a slight mistake in these 
l+((tc-t)/ ~t) 0 
calculations, which suggests a slightly different form for equation (1.27). 
1.3.5 Amendment to nonlinear log-periodic model 
We show in this subsection that the form of (1.27), should be slightly amended. We 
demonstrate the suggested form of modifications by a direct integration approach, but the 
result can be equivalently verified by performing the reverse differentiation. We start with 
the pairs of differential equations (1.22), (1.23). Let Y = B 2 • Then (1.22) becomes 
j y + ~/B~ = /(2o:d(log(x)), (1.28) 
where B~ = o:f1J. The integral on the left-hand side becomes 
Exponentiating the resulting integrals in (1.28), we obtain 
(y :B~) = (x/xo)2a, 
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where xo is an arbitrary constant. Rearranging, we finally obtain that 
(1.29) 
The form of (1.29) also means that we have a slightly different solution to (1.25). Writing 
things out in full, we have 
8tjJ 2 
8log(x) = w + KB . (1.30) 
Performing the integration directly, we can see that we have 
t/J = wlog(xfxo,2)- B!, 2: log(l- (xfxo)
2a), (1.31) 
for some arbitrary constant xo,2· Working in the same vein as Sornette and Johansen, and 
retaining solely the real parts, the solution for F(x) is given by 
(xfxo)a 2 K 
F(x) = Bo cos[wlog(xfxo)- B00 -log(l- (xfxo) 2a)J. vi- (xfxo) 2a 2a (1.32) 
This suggests as a pragmatic generalization of (1.17) 
(tc- t)a ~w 
y(t) = A+B J 2 [l+Ccos[wlog(tc-t)--2 log(l- ((tc- t)/~t)2a)+c/>]]. 1-((tc-t)j~t)a a 
(1.33) 
This form is almost identical to (1.27) except for two changes of sign from plus to minus. 
1.4 Data analysis 
We apply the models discussed here to three major indices; the S&P500 index prior to the 
crash of 1987, the Nasdaq index prior to the crash in prices observed in April 2000, and 
the Hong Kong Hang Seng index prior to a crash observed in early 1994. Thus we look at 
a variety of different crashes, in different markets, and at different times. We look at data 
from both four years and two years before the crash, and look for any differences between 
the two. Specifically, for the S&P 500 we look at daily data from both September 1st 1983 
and September 3rd 1985 to September 30th 1987. For the Nasdaq we look at data from 
March 1st 1996 and March 2nd 1998 to March 31st 2000, and for the Hang Seng from 
December 1st 1989 and December 2nd 1991 to December 31st 1993. 
Parameter estimation is not easy. Here no constraints were imposed on parameters, and 
estimation was performed by the method of least squares. Equations (1.8), (1.17), and 
(1.33) are"partially linear", with respect to A, B, and BC. In principle, these equations can 
be estimated using the Golub-Pereyra algorithm, for partially linear non-linear regression 
models, without the need to state starting values for the partially linear parameters A, B 
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and BC [104}, Chapter 9, Page 275. However, in practice we found that the easiest and 
most robust approach was to use the Nelder-Mead method whilst using the Golub-Pereya 
algorithm to provide choices of starting values. The Nelder-Mead method is a gradient 
search based method which can be used to solve complicated numerical optimisation 
problems without specifying derivatives. In using this method we took care to consider a 
range of randomly generated starting values for the algorithm as nonlinear problems with 
multiple local minima may be extremely sensitive to the choice of starting value. For a 
reference on optimisation see (87}. 
From simple exploratory plots, it becomes clear that it does indeed appear reasonable to 
fit the models discussed in Section 3. A fit of the logarithm of the Hang Seng index by a 
simple power law (1.8) and the iinear fracture model (1.17) both appear reasonable (see 
Figure 1.1). However, there may also be a rather subtle suggestion that the fit of the 
power law model is such that the log-periodic model may just be simply over-fitting noise. 
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Figure 1.1: Left panel: Plot ofLog(Hang Seng) from December 2nd 1991 to December 31st 
1993 and a fit by a power law model with estimated parameters tc = 1994.00, a = 0.38, A = 
9.44, B = -0.7 4. llight panel: Fit by the fracture model with estimated parameters 
tc = 1994.13,a = 0.2,w = 7.76,</> = 2.78,A = 10.32,B = -1.59,C = 0.07. 
The crash of 1987, infamously occurred on Black Monday, October 19th 1987 which 
corresponds to 1987.8. We take the time of the crash on the Hang Seng to be January 
1994, and the crash on the Nasdaq to be sometime in April 2000. Plots over the relevant 
time scales in question are shown in Figure 1.2. Reasonable estimates of the crash-time 
might be April 10th 2000 or 2000.276 for the Nasdaq crash, which is the seventh trading 
day shown. Similarly, a reasonable estimate for the Hang Seng crash appears to be the 
fifth trading day shown which corresponds to January 6th 1994 or 1994.016. 
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Figure 1.2: Plot of Nasdaq and Hang Seng indices over crash period 
Results for the linear fracture model ((1.17), lfm) and the amended nonlinear log-periodic 
model ((1.33), nlp) are shown in Table 1.1. At least superficially these models appear to 
fit the data well with large R2 values suggesting that these models explain a large degree 
of the variability in the data. The results also appear to give reasonable and interpretable 
estimates of the parameter tc, the time when the market is adjudged most likely to crash. 
The estimated standard errors for the estimates of tc are generally smaller for the more 
complicated nonlinear model. 
1.5 Conclusions 
Interpretable crash time estimates and a generally good fit to data suggest that the 
models considered here are capable of detecting genuine features in financial data. The 
generalisation proposed by Sornette and Johansen in (1.33) performs well and seems 
to provide better estimates of tc, than the linear fracture model {1.17). Moreover, the 
estimated standard errors are generally smaller for the more complicated nonlinear model. 
There is however some suggestion that despite such an apparently good fit the models 
considered here might be susceptible to over-fitting noise, with some suggestion from 
Figure 1.1 that a power law growth dominates any apparent log-periodic oscillations. In 
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Market Time Span Model R"' tc (e.s.e) 
S&P 500 4 years nip 98.24 1988.00 (0.030) 
4 years If m 97.59 1990.35 (0.148) 
2 years nip 98.23 1987.99 (0.007) 
2 years If m 97.87 1988.00 (0.043) 
Nasdaq 4 years nlp 97.95 2000.33 (0.007) 
4 years lfm 97.75 2000.87 (0.055) 
2 years nip 97.48 2000.40 (0.019) 
2 years lfm 97.34 2005.59 (0.974) 
Hang Seng 4 years nlp 97.88 1994.16 (0.329) 
4 years If m 97.56 1995.43 (0.299) 
2 years nlp 96.04 1994.00 (0.010) 
2 years lfm 95.06 1994.13 (0.011) 
Table 1.1: Results for log-periodic models 
Chapters 2 we consider a more simple expressions for the log-price in a non-linear regression 
formulation of the problem, before examining more realistic SDE models in Chapters 3-5. 
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Chapter 2 
Simple models for bubbles 
2.1 Motivation 
As discussed in Chapter 1.3.4-1.3.5, the Sornette-Johansen methodology entails fitting the 
following expressions to the log-price: 
y(t) =A+ B(tc- t) 1- 0 (1 + Ccos(</J + wlog(tc- t))) + €t, (2.1) 
and 
y(t) = A+ B (tc- t)a X J1 + ((tc- t)j~t)2a 
[ 1 + Ccos[wlog(tc- t) + ~: log(1 + ( (tc- t)/ ~t)20 ) + <PJ] + €t, (2.2) 
where the €t are i.i.d. zero-mean errors, y(t) is the log-price and the parameter tc represents 
the most likely time for the market to crash. Further details and methodology are given in 
{52} and {97}. For critical reviews see {99}, {40}, and (98}. {93}, Chapter 6, describes log-
periodic oscillations as enabling one to "lock in" on oscillations relevant to the critical data 
tc (the time when a crash is most likely). These oscillations represent periodic corrections 
to departures from plain power-law type behaviour. Plotting log-prices against time, what 
is arguably more noticeable is an approximate power-law growth with any apparent log-
periodic oscillations appearing somewhat secondary, see Figure 1.1. 
The Sornette-Johansen method has come under some criticism. {99} criticizes Sornette 
(see also {40}) essentially for a perceived continued lack of rigour. (65} makes three 
criticisms of Sornette's work. A criticism is made that (2.2) is not based on a convincing 
underlying theoretical model. A further criticism was made that the method requires 
estimation of a large number of parameters (in this case nine), and a further concern that 
these formula may simply be over-fitting noise. We have some sympathy with this point of 
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view. A plot of the logarithm of the S&P 500 index (Yi) together with the fitted values of 
the simple model Yi =A+ B(tc- ti)<:r + T/i, where the T/i follow an AR(2) process is shown 
in Figure 2.1. One might argue that this is not really a serious candidate model for the 
price process as many models for financial processes such as the random walk model are 
non-stationary unit root processes. However, this plot seems sufficient to argue that simple 
statistical fluctuations might be enough to generate an apparently log-periodic signal and 
we should perhaps look for a more simple model. By a simple exploratory analysis it 
seems that rather than log-periodicity, we should perhaps instead seek to model super-
exponential growth1. If the underlying model for the price is geometric Brownian motion, 
then the log-returns (first difference of the log-price) will be an i.i.d. sequence of normal 
random variables. Table 2.1 gives the empirical values ofthe mean and standard deviation 
of log-returns. Higher log-return means are observed in the two-years immediately prior 
to the crash. Higher standard deviations in the two years immediately before crashes also . 
seem to point to an increase in volatility prior to crashes. 
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Figure 2.1: Plot of Log(S&P500) and fit of power-law model with autocorrelated errors 
Financial crashes are often viewed along the lines of the title of Shiller's Irrational 
1For reference, the comment is made in [26}, Chapter 7, that to a reasonable approximation, most time 
series in economics tend to exhibit roughly exponential growth on average. 
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Index Time span Mean (standard deviation) 
S&P 500 Four years 0.000653 (0.00826) 
Two years 0.00102 (0.00916) 
Nasdaq Four years 0.00139 (0.0151) 
Two years 0.00181 (0.0184) 
Hang Seng Four years 0.00144 (0.013009) 
Two years 0.00205 (0.01408) 
Table 2.1: Means and standard deviations of log-returns 
Exuberance {89}. However, some recent work suggests that this might in fact not be 
the case, and there may be some mileage in regarding the process as obeying principles 
of rationality. An economic mechanism may exist whereby, as stated by {93}, Chapter 
5 page 137, sufficiently many traders behave in such a way that prices tend to reflect all 
available information. As this happens, the inherent risks are approximately fairly priced. 
The aim of this chapter is to produce a simple model without log-periodicity, but which 
is interpretable econometrically and is still able to account for super-exponential growth. 
In the second section we present, for illustration, an admittedly brief review of some of 
the theories of financial crashes that can be found in the economics literature. In the 
third section we describe the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model of financial crashes, 
as presented in [52}. The authors' original intention was to produce a simple model 
where, at least in the regime leading to a financial crash, log-prices exhibit a power-law 
acceleration. Log-periodicity in finance is then motivated by analogy with a statistical 
mechanics model - solved by [32}- in which log-periodicity occurs and generalises the 
plain power-law. We present a simple extension to the original formulation. The rather 
striking conclusion is that, rather than exhibiting log-periodic oscillations before a crash, 
log-prices should be the sum of a linear trend and a super-exponential growth term. We 
are thus lead to an elegant nested model formulation of the problem. Section 4 describes 
backward predictions corresponding to observed crashes. Section 5 is a brief section on 
residual model checks. Section 6 is a conclusion. 
2.2 Some economic theories of financial crashes 
{84} disputes the idea of irrational roots of crises. According to {84}, investors may be 
drawn to the market at times of great uncertainty, by the possibility of large potential 
profits. Under this interpretation, there is thus no requirement for mass irrationality in 
order for a stock market to crash. The view of [84} is that since, at least to a reasonable 
approximation, traders can heed all available information and still participate in such 
dangerous markets, crashes in fact perform a vital house-cleaning function. Crashes are 
seen as allowing the market - somewhat brutally - to sort truly profitable investments 
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from merely illusory ones. 
{108] and {21] stress the importance of economic fundamentals. According to {108] the 
key economic mechanism is informational overshooting. Market fundamentals change over 
an unknown period of time, and the economy undergoes a boom. A crash finally occurs 
as information is processed when the boom comes to an end. Informational overshooting 
occurs when the market expands to a new capacity, which is unknown until this capacity 
is finally reached. This overshooting can occur in two ways, either increased productivity 
brought about by rapid technological progress, or by an influx of new investors into the 
stock market. {108] goes on to state that the fact that financialliberalisations (literally 
economic freedoms) are typically followed by booms and crashes, reflects that it is possible 
to identify an underlying economic process behind the mass panics and hysterias. 
{21] also focus on the role played by so-called economic fundamentals. However, in 
contrast to Zeira, they focus more on technology shocks - factors affecting production -
than on the nature of the flow of information. According to {21 ], when an old mode 
of production cannot be improved further, it is dismissed and progressively replaced 
by a newer one. The dismissal of the old technology and the introduction of new 
machines trigger recessions. These recessions may continue for a few periods while the 
new technology is being developed, but end before the development of the new machines is 
completed. According to {21 ], their model predicts large and sudden stock market crashes 
which follow periods of regular growth. These crashes are the result of fundamental factors 
and not the result of market inefficiencies, nor irrational behaviour of investors. According 
to {21], their model predicts market crashes of the order of 30%. However, the comment 
is made in {86], that a slight computational error occurs in this paper, and in fact the 
model can generate falls of the order of 25-50%. 
{67] takes a similar point of view to [108] and emphasises the role played by informational 
aggregation. However, in contrast to [108], [67] does not pay explicit attention to the 
role of economic fundamentals. According to {67], hidden information in the market may 
be released by a small trigger and in this model information aggregation can cause a crash, 
even when investors behave rationally. Irrationality of bubbles is also at odds with the 
rational bubble models considered by {60]. 
2.3 JLS Power-Law model 
[93], Chapter 5 page 137, assumes that sufficiently many traders behave in such a way that 
"prices tend to reflect available information and risk is adequately and approximately fairly 
remunerated". It is this economic mechanism - of inherent risks faithfully reflected by 
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prices- which we hope will prove insightful here. In this section we discuss the Johansen-
Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) power law model as presented in {52). In the original paper this 
model is simply used as a stepping stone to motivating a log-periodic model in finance. 
We consider a purely speculative asset that pays no dividends. This simple model assumes 
that only one crash can occur and so the effects of any past crashes are ignored. JLS assume 
for the sake of simplicity that in the case of a crash, the price drops by a fixed percentage 
~~:E(O, 1). We introduce the filtration :Ft, (t >to) to model the flow ofrelevant information. 
To model a crash we consider a jump-process j(t) which takes the values {0, 1}. We define 
a non-negative continuous random variable X which corresponds to the time of the crash 
so that X= inf{t: j(t):fO}. Johansen et al. start by ignoring the effects of the interest 
rate, risk aversion, information asymmetry and the market-clearing condition. Johansen 
et al. then state that in this dramatically simplified framework, rational expectations are 
simply equivalent to a martingale hypothesis for the price process: 
E[p(t')I:Ft] = p(t), (2.3) 
where t'>t and j(t) and p(t) are adapted to the filtration :Ft, (t > t0 ). Ignoring a zero-
mean noise term, the dynamics of the asset price up to and including the crash is given 
by 
dp(t) = J..L(t)p(t)dt- ~~:p(t)dj(t), (2.4) 
where J..L(t) is a time-dependent drift chosen in order to satisfy the martingale condition 
and the dj(t) term corresponds to the jump process j(t). Equation (2.4) states that the 
price exhibits a general growth trend, which is offset by the crash when it finally happens. 
(2.4) is a very simple separable stochastic differential equation, which can be solved exactly 
to give 
p(t) = p(to) exp {1: J..L(s)ds- ~~:j(t)}. (2.5) 
If we impose a martingale condition, this has implications for J..L(·) in (2.5) and helps to 
give the model empirically testable content. 
2.3.1 First-order martingale approximation 
Here, we introduce the hazard rate h(t) and consider the non-negative continuous random 
variable X which corresponds to the time of the crash. The hazard rate2 h(t) of X is 
2If F is the absolutely continuous cdf of a random variable X with density/, the hazard rate is simply 
given by h(t) = /(t)/(1- F(t)). 
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defined as 
This suggests that if the crash has not happened by time t, the conditional probability 
that the crash will occur within a small period of time [t, t + 8] is 8h(t) + o(8). Next we 
replace the continuous time dynamics in (2.4) with the discrete approximation 
p(t + 8)- p(t) = p(t)p(t)8- Kp(t)[j(t + 8)- j(t)j. (2.6) 
Suppose that the crash has not happened by time t. Invoking the martingale condition 
when taking conditional expectations in (2.6) we get 
E[p(t + 8)- p(t)lFt] = p(t)p(t)8- Kp(t)E[j(t + 8)- j(t)JFt], 
= 8p(t)[p(t)- Kh(t) + o(8)/8] 
= 0, (2.7) 
where we have used Pr(j(t + 8) - j(t) = lJj(t) = 0) = Pr(X E (t, t + 8)JX > 
t) = 8h(t) + o(8). Since the price p(t) is assumed to remain positive, we obtain 
p(t)- Kh(t) + o(8)/8 = 0, and on taking the limit 8l0 we get 
p(t) - Kh(t) = 0. (2.8) 
Thus with (2.8) in mind, it is probably equally valid to interpret K as some kind of 
coefficient of risk aversion, rather than its slightly artificial introduction as the pre-
determined size of a crash. The important economic intuition behind (2.8) is that as 
the probability of the crash increases, the price must increase on average in order to 
induce traders into holding the asset. Inserting (2.8) into (2.5) predicts that we have 
log(p(t)) = log(p(to)) + K [ h(u)du (2.9) 
as our pre-crash dynamics. JLS build on (2.9) by assuming that the stock market evolves 
- to a good approximation - according to a statistical mechanics model similar to the 
2-d !sing model. In models of this kind, there is a critical point Kc that determines the 
properties of the system. When K < Kc disorder dominates and sensitivity to a small 
global influence is small. Clusters of like spins are small in size and imitation of signs 
propagates only between close neighbours. Here the susceptibility x, defined in Chapter 
1, is finite. As K increases towards Kc, order starts to appear, and the system becomes 
extremely sensitive to a small global perturbation. Large clusters of spins with the same 
size occur, and imitation propagates over large distances. In this case the susceptibility 
x tends to infinity. This is one of the characteristics of critical phenomena. One of the 
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hallmarks of criticality is the power law increase of the susceptibility: 
(2.10) 
where A and a are positive constants. For the 2-d !sing model a= 7/4 {52}. We do not 
know the dynamics that drive the key parameter K of our toy model of the stock market. 
JLS are merely content to assume that the parameter K evolves as a sufficiently smooth 
function of time t, so that we have (Kc- K(t))~B(tc- t), where iJ is some constant 
independent oft. Using this approximation, JLS posit that the hazard function behaves 
in a manner comparable to the susceptibility as defined above. Thus we have 
(2.11) 
for some constant B = AiJ-cr. If we assume that this condition holds exactly, we note 
that integrating (2.11) would give 
-B 
-ln(1- F(t)) = -
1
-(tc- t)l-o + Const., 
-a 
(2.12) 
and (2.12) enables us to recover F(t). However, we note that a= 1 would also be a valid 
exponent. In this case integrating (2.11) leads to 
F(t) = 1- A(tc- t) 8 , 
where A is a constant determined by the initial conditions. Assuming equality in (2.11) 
and using (2.9) leaves us with the following prediction for the pre-crash dynamics: 
log(p(t)) = log(p(to)) + C(tc- t) 1- 0 , (2.13) 
where C = }~~, (a:;H). The model of {52} assumes that a is constrained to lie in the 
region (0, 1). Under the specification "'• B?::.O and 0 <a< 1, it follows that C is negative. 
The original JLS paper merely used these workings to motivate a log-periodic model 
in finance. In certain systems, as discussed in Chapter 1, log-periodicity and complex 
exponents occur and generalise power laws with purely real exponents. Based on this 
analogy, {52} insert a log-periodic hazard function h(t) into (2.9) in place of a plain power 
law hazard function. 
Here, we take the view that the original JLS power law model can be improved upon very 
simply without log-periodicity. We do this by introducing the interest rate. In particular, 
we assume that it is the discounted price process rather than the raw price process that 
satisfies the martingale condition. Thus we replace (2.3) by 
(2.14) 
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where r > 0 represents a constant interest rate. We claim that (2.14) is more realistic 
than {2.3) and allows us to incorporate a "baseline" exponential growth into the model. 
Upon taking conditional expectations, {2. 7) now becomes 
p(t)(1 + rfJ + o(fJ))- p(t), (2.15) 
since r is a constant interest rate. To see this we note that if q(t) = e-rtp(t), E(q(t + 
fJ)IFt) = q(t) = e-rtp(t). So E(p(t + fJ)IFt) = er6p(t). (2.15) leaves us with 
fJp(t)[r + o(fJ)jfJ] = fJp(t)[J.t(t)- Kh(t) + o(fl)/fl], 
which implies 
J.t(t)- Kh(t)- r + o(fJ)jfJ = 0, 
and taking the limit fJ~O gives 
J.t(t) - r- Kh(t) = 0. (2.16) 
(2.16) has been previously derived in the literature, see for instance {99}, although it does 
not seem to have been estimated statistically. (2.16) inserted into (2.5) now predicts as 
our pre-crash dynamics 
log(p(t)) =A+ rt + C(tc- t) 1-a, (2.17) 
where A is a constant determined by the unknown initial conditions. In practice when 
estimating (2.17) we find 1 -a ~ 0. This suggests logarithmic behaviour and that we may 
reasonably take a = 1 in (2 .11). In this case ( 2 .17) becomes 
log(p(t)) =A+ rt + C ln(tc- t), (2.18) 
where C = -KB. Equations (2.17) and (2.18) are interesting as they describe a 
hypothesised super-exponential growth associated with risky markets. We refer to (2.17) 
and (2.18) as the SEG model. The super-exponential growth acts as bait which enables 
rational investors to be attracted to risky markets. Note that in a 'fundamental' regime 
where h(t)~O, we have 
log(p(t)) =A+ rt. 
Thus, if (2.17) and (2.18) are to be associated with bubbles, then the fits obtained should 
show clear deviations from a straight line. 
26 
2.4 Backward predictions 
In this section we fit the SEG model (2.18) against the price series prior to the observed 
crashes that we examined in the previous chapter, using ordinary least squares. The fit of 
the SEG model is generally good and explains around 98% of the variation in the log-price 
series. A plot of the fit obtained is shown in Figure 5.3. It seems that looking at four 
years of data may be preferable to looking at two years of data, as looking at four years 
of data it appears easier to visually identify the super-exponential growth that our simple 
model predicts. We discuss results for each of the markets in detail. 
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Figure 2.2: The SEG model as fitted to S&P500. Left panel: 1983 to 1987. Right panel: 
1985 to 1987 
2.4.1 S&P 500 
The results for the S&P 500 index are shown in Table 2.2. The values of tc correspond 
to January 1989 and early November 1987 respectively. The numbers in brackets denote 
estimated standard errors. However, note that the estimated standard error for the C 
parameter suggests that for the final two years the SEG terms are non-significant. These 
results reinforce the impression from Figure 2.2 that when testing for bubbles, four years of 
data may be preferable to two years of data. Note also from changing parameter estimates 
that there is some inherent non-stationarity that our simple model is unable to account 
for. These results also suggest that it would be reasonable to consider models for changing 
expectations in order to describe crashes. However, this is not something we pursue further 
here. Models for change-point deteCtion in financial data are discussed in {60]. 
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Parameter Four years Two years 
A 8.941 (0.129) 4.860 (0.103) 
r 0.000 (0.000) 9.589 * 10-4(4.469 * 10-5) 
c -0.546 (0.017) -0.015 (0.012) 
tc 1325.097 (19.604) 1061.816 (41.319) 
Table 2.2: Results for SEG model on S&P 500 
2.4.2 Nasdaq 
The results for the Nasdaq index are shown below in Table 2.3. Here estimated standard 
errors suggest that the SEG term is significant for both time periods. The estimates of tc 
correspond to early May 2000 and early June 2000. Combined with associated estimated 
standard errors of around 5.583 days and 6.904 days, these results seem reasonable. 
Changing parameter estimates again suggest some inherent non-stationarity that our 
simple model is unable to account for. A plot of the fit obtained is shown in Figure 
2.3 and appears reasonable in both cases. Note also that in both cases the fit obtained 
shows a clear departure from a straight line. Thus whilst this model is unable to handle 
some of the inherent non-stationarity, it is nonetheless interesting as a phenomenological 
description of the super-exponential growth prior to the crash. 
Parameter Four years Two years 
A 9.522 (0.150) 10.680 (0.120) 
r 3.546 * 10-4(3.454 * 10-5) 0.000 (0.000) 
c -0.360 (0.021) -0.510 (0.037) 
tc 1068.853 (5.583) 1093.634 (6.904) 
Table 2.3: Results for SEG model on Nasdaq 
2.4.3 Hang Seng 
The results for the Hang Seng index are shown below in Table 2.4. This time we seem to 
have rather less evidence for non-stationarity as the results obtained appear to be similar 
for both periods. The predicted crash times correspond to early January 1994 which seems 
reasonable. From the estimated standard errors all terms in the model appear significant 
and we seem to have strong evidence for super-exponential growth prior to the crash. A 
plot of the fit obtained is shown in Figure 2.4 and appears reasonable. 
2.5 Brief model checks 
The SEG model is primarily of interest as it is a simple theoretical model which describes 
the phenomenology of super-exponential growth prior to financial crashes. The regression 
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Figure 2.3: The SEG model as fitted to the Nasdaq. Left panel: 1996 to 2000. Right 
panel: 1998 to 2000 
Parameter Four years Two years 
A 8.580 (0.050) 8.923 (0.108) 
r 9.009 * 10-4 (1.902 * 10-5) 6.375 * 10-4 (5.818 * 10-5 ) 
c -0.102 (0.007) -0.126 (0.012) 
ic 1016.050 (1.270) 1017.226 (1.731) 
Table 2.4: Results for SEG model on Hang Seng 
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Figure 2.4: The SEG model as fitted to the Hang Seng. Left panel: 1989 to 1993. Right 
panel: 1991 to 1993 
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analysis in Section 4 assume that the residuals ei = Yi -A- rti + Cln(tc - ti) should 
constitute an i.i.d. sequence from N(O, a 2 ). There are two key ways in which these model 
assumptions are violated. A normal plot of the residuals, see Figure 2.5, appears reasonable 
but does suggest some deviation from Normality in the tails. Most importantly, an ACF 
plot in Figure 2.6 shows that the residuals appear to be very highly correlated. (We can 
also detect signs that the residuals may be correlated by looking at the plots of best fit in 
Section 4.) One might consider trying to model the residuals as a low-order autoregressive 
process, see for instance /88}, Chapter 6, /29}. However, in practice, this method suffers 
from the fact that the estimated autoregressive models are close to non-stationary unit 
root processes. 
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Figure 2.5: Sample normal probability plot for residuals of the SEG model 
Both these problems can be rectified by considering stochastic differential equation models 
for financial bubbles. See Chapter 3. As a consequence of this, we can develop a formal 
statistical test for bubbles which can then be used in out-of-sample applications. For the 
prediction problem, which we discuss in Chapter 5, we propose to combine the SDE models 
in Chapter 3 with the simple SEG model in this chapter. 
2.6 Conclusions 
A very brief exploratory analysis suggested that very simple stochastic behaviour might 
produce an apparent log-periodic signal. Thus despite encouraging results in the previous 
chapter there is some suggestion that the log-periodic formulae may be susceptible to over-
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Figure 2.6: Sample ACF plot for residuals of the SEG model 
fitting noise when applied to financial time series. Looking for something more simple, a 
very basic exploratory analysis suggested that rather than log-periodicity we could seek 
to model super-exponential growth. Some economic interpretations of financial crashes 
were discussed. In particular, the most interesting concept was that a crash might have a 
rational root, with investors induced into holding risky assets if the potential rewards were 
sufficiently high {84]. The JLS power-law model introduced in Section 3, is an interesting 
piece of applied mathematics and was intended to illustrate this feature. 
A simple extension of the first-order martingale approximation in the JLS model was 
discussed. A slight modification of the original approach suggests that the log-price 
experiences a logarithmic singularity of the form oc ln(tc - t) prior to a crash. Further, 
the model leads to a possible framework for both nested models comparisons and simple 
graphical tests for bubbles. We find evidence of super-exponential growth prior to observed 
crashes on the S&P 500, Nasdaq and the Hang Seng. However, the super-exponential 
growth terms were non-significant for the S&P 500 when restricting the analysis to just two 
years of data and hence it appears that in order to detect bubbles and super-exponential 
growth, four years of data rather than just two years might be appropriate. The model was 
used to provide interesting back-testing results prior to observed crashes on the S&P500, 
the Nasdaq and the Hang Seng. However, changing parameter estimates suggest some 
inherent non-stationarity that our simple model is unable to account for. There are also 
two ways in which model assumptions appear to be violated. A normal probability plot 
gives some suggestion of non-normality of residuals. Further, it appears that residuals 
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for this model are very highly correlated. We note that both of these problems can be 
rectified by the SDE models in the next chapter. 
For completeness, the exact definition of the hazard rate is given in Appendix A. It might 
be of interest to incorporate this directly into the model. One way to do this might involve 
a Bayesian formulation of the problem (see [28/). 
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Chapter 3 
SDE models for bubbles 
3.1 Motivation 
In this chapter we begin to consider tests for out-of-sample application of the SEG 
model. Hence, we are naturally drawn to consider stochastic differential equation (SDE) 
models for bubbles as we try to avoid spuriously regressing a random walk. We use 
the model developed in practical applications in later chapters. In Chapter 4 we use a 
novel application of the Sornette-Andersen model, [94], to gauge which factors remain 
significant once we take into account super-exponential growth. In Chapter 5 we suggest 
use of an SDE model, formulated in this chapter, alongside material developed in Chapter 
2 for out-of-sample work. 
In addition to practical considerations, there are also interesting theoretical considerations 
which motivate material in this chapter. The discussion in [2] suggests that it might be 
possible to have a hierarchy of models for bubbles, see also {94]. There is a proposed 
division between fearless and fearful bubbles. In the JLS power law model, a crash is 
preceded by super-exponential growth only. This corresponds to a fearless bubble regime. 
In the model of {94], super-exponential growth can be accompanied by an increase in 
volatility - a fearful bubble regime. 
Initially, in Section 1, we restrict attention to the case where the background noise is 
Brownian motion. We have three competing models; geometric Brownian motion as a 
proxy for the absence of bubbles, an SDE formulation of the JLS power law model, and 
the model of [94]. We reject the proposed fearless bubble formulation, and instead the 
main point of interest appears to be that the Sornette-Andersen model represents an 
empirically reasonable SDE extension of earlier ODE models for bubbles. We discuss the 
solution of the Sornette-Andersen model [94] which constitutes a nonlinear generalisation 
of the Black-Scholes model of a financial market. By discussing the solution to this model, 
33 
we show how two identifiability constraints can be made which reduce the apparently 
six-dimensional estimation problem into a four-dimensional problem. In [2], where an 
attempt was made to estimate the Sornette-Andersen model statistically, the authors 
erroneously claim that the likelihood-ratio test cannot be used to reliably choose the 
correct model for a given time series. However, as we demonstrate, the likelihood function 
for the Sornette-Andersen model can be written down exactly. Moreover, the first-order 
maximum likelihood condition further reduces the four dimensional problem to a two-
dimensional parameter search, which can be easily solved numerically. 
One of the so-called stylised empirical facts of financial markets, see for example [31}, 
Chapter 7 page 210, is that financial data, particularly on short time-scales, is seen to 
exhibit heavy-tailed non-Gaussian behaviour. In Section 2, we consider a reformulation of 
the Sornette-Andersen model using a heavy-tailed hyperbolic process as the background 
driving noise. We are thus able to further refine SDE models and empirical tests for 
bubbles. Section 3 is a brief conclusion. 
3.2 No bubble vs. Fearless bubble vs. Fearful bubble 
3.2.1 No bubble model: Geometric Brownian Motion 
Neglecting heavy-tailed non-Gaussian effects, one might use geometric Brownian as a 
reasonable non-bubble proxy model of a financial market. This model assumes the 
following SDE for the price Xt: 
(3.1) 
where (Wt, t > 0) is standard Brownian motion, J.L E 1R and u > 0. Using !to's formula, 
it follows that Yt = log(Xt) has the stochastic differential 
dYt = (J.L- u 2 /2)dt + udWt, 
= adt + udWt, (3.2) 
where a = J.L - u2 /2. We can recognise (3.2) as the equation for Brownian motion with 
drift. If we observe Yi from Yt at time i, the product of these transition densities for Yt 
can then be written as 
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Using the rule for transformations of univariate random variables, we can write the 
likelihood for the observed prices Xi as 
n 1 (log(x;)-o-log(x; 1 ))2 IJ e- 2a 
i=2 v'2-rraxi 
so that the log-likelihood function becomes 
n- 11 (2 ) ( 1) 1 ( ) Ln 1 ( ) Ln (log(xi)- a:- log(Xi-1))2 
--- og 1r - n- og a - og x· -2 ' 2 2 ' i=2 i=2 (1 
This leads to the maximum likelihood estimates 
& = 
where ll.yi = Yi+l - Yi· 
3.2.2 Fearless bubble model 
"'n-1 A 
L...i= 1 1-J. Yi 
n-1 
"'n-1(" ")2 L...i=l t..J.Yi - a: 
n-1 
(3.3) 
If one assumes that the noise added on the end of the log-price in the JLS power-law 
model is Brownian motion, this model can be formulated as 
(3.4) 
where the dj term corresponds to a jump term which occurs with fixed amplitude ""· 
Before a crash, so that the dj term remains zero, a first-order martingale argument given 
in Chapter 2 necessitates that J.L(t) = r + ,..h(t), where h(t) is the hazard function of the 
non-negative continuous random variable X which determines the time of the crash. These 
considerations suggest that the pre-crash dynalnics of the fearless bubble model in (3.4) 
should be 
(3.5) 
where we have assumed that h(t) = B(tc- t)-a. We may solve this model as follows. Let 
B(t t)l-o yt = log(Xt)- rt + ~-=_a, . It follows from !to's formula that 
-(12 
dyt = - 2-dt + adWt. (3.6) 
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It follows from (3.6) that if we observe Yi from yt at time i, the product of these transition 
densities for Yi can then be written as 
Using the rule for transformations of univariate random variables, we can write the 
likelihood for the observed prices Xi as 
(3.7) 
where 1 = r- a 2 /2. From (3. 7), the log-likelihood function is 
l(8IX) = n21 log(2rr)- (n- 1) log( a)- L:~=2 log(xi) 
1 "n (log{x·)-"' -log{x· ) + B(tc-i)l-o- B(tc-i+l)l-o)2 (3.8) 
2(T2" L.n=2 t ' t-1 l-et l-et · 
Note that (3.8) contains five parameters, and has to be maximised numerically. 
3.2.3 Fearful bubble model 
This model is discussed in [94} and [2}. Not only is the model an SDE alternative to the 
ostensibly ODE-based JLS power-law model, it is intended to account for the possibility 
that prior to a crash we may have both super-exponential growth and an increase in 
volatility. The starting point is to choose a nonlinear SDE for the bubble price Bt to 
generalise (3.4): 
(3.9) 
where the dj(t) term corresponds to a jump process as before and "' is assumed to be 
an observation from some distribution with finite mean which determines the size of the 
crash. Suppose that the bubble process obeys the martingale property and let B(t) and 
j(t) be adapted to the filtration Ft, t > 0. A simple linearisation argument suggests that 
if a crash has not happened by time t 
E[Bt+6- BtlFt] ~ 8J.L(Bt)Bt- Bt(E("'(j(t + 8)- j(t))IFt), 
= dJ.L(Bt)Bt- Bt <"' > (ah(t) + o(a)), 
= 8Bt [J.L(Bt)- < "'> (h(t) + o(8)/8)], 
= 0, 
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where we have assumed that K is independent of the filtration Ft. If Bt is non-zero, we 
must have JL(Bt)- < K > h(t) + o(8)/8 = 0, and taking the limit 8!0 leaves us with 
h(t) = JL(Bt) . 
<K> (3.10) 
(3.10) is intended to illustrate the risk-return interplay inherent within the bubble process. 
However, in contrast to the JLS power law model, [52}, it is the price which drives the 
hazard rate rather than the reverse. In {94} (3.10) is referred to as the variable hazard-
rate and gives a possible way of applying the model to summarise risk levels in financial 
applications. (3.9) suggests that prior to a crash the bubble dynamics should be 
[94} use 
J.L(Bt)Bt = 2~t [Bta(BtW + JLo[Bt/ Bo]m, 
a(Bt)Bt = ao[Btf Bo]m, 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
where m, Bo, ao, J.LO are all positive constants. The exact form of (3.12) is chosen 
as a convenient device to simplify the solution of the stochastic differential equations 
when applying Ita's formula. (3.12) and (3.13) are intended to represent a nonlinear 
generalisation of geometric Brownian motion which is recovered for m = 1. The power 
laws in (3.12) and (3.13) are assumed to be a simple and meaningful way of incorporating 
nonlinearity. As we discuss later, this nonlinearity creates a singularity in finite time 
which becomes stochastic in this SDE framework. This nonlinearity is also interesting 
as a phenomenological description of an explosive bubble phase that continues to feed on 
itself. We note that the power B? can be decomposed as B? = B;n-1 xBt so that B;n.-1 , 
which plays the role of a growth rate, is a function of the bubble itself. This is intended to 
capture a positive feedback effect whereby a larger bubble Bt feeds a larger growth rate, 
which in turn leads to a larger bubble, and so on. 
As a statistical formulation of the model, [2} use 
P(t) = Fert B(t), (3.14) 
where F denotes a constant fundamental value and r denotes a constant interest rate. 
Direct application of the model in (3.14) then requires estimation of six parameters 
(F, r, m, Bo, a0, J.LO) and a seventh if one estimates the unknown constant determined by 
the initial conditions in (3.11). Here we choose the identifiability constraint F = 1, 
since it follows from (3.11-3.13) that Y1(t) = ertB(t) and Y2(t) = >.ertB(t) satisfy the 
same stochastic differential equation. In the sequel we show how to solve this model and 
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demonstrate how a further identifiability constraint can be made. Let P(t) = ert B(t). It 
follows from !to's formula that 
dP(t) = (J.L(B(t)) + r)P(t)dt + a(B(t)))P(t)dWt. 
Next, define Y(t) = P(t)1-mer(m-1)t. Using lto's formula, it follows that 
dY(t) = (1- m)P(t)-mer(m-1)t[J.L(B(t))P(t)dt + a(B(t))P(t)dWt] 
{1 -
2
m)m P(t)-m-1er(m-1)ta2(B(t))P(t)2dt. (3.15) 
In order to solve (3.15), we note that from (3.12) and (3.13) 
J.L(B(t)) = ; (a(B(t)))2 + J.LoB~~m-1' 
0 
a(B(t)) = aoB(t)m-
1 
B[f 
Plugging these expressions into (3.15) leaves us with 
dY(t) 
Next, using B(t) = e-rt P(t), (3.17) simplifies to give 
dY(t) = J.Lo(1- m) dt + (1- m)ao dW 
Bm Bm t· 
0 0 
{3.16) 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
From {3.18) it appears that we may impose the identifiability constraint Bo = 1, as 
including this parameter in the model does not provide any additional information. 
Further, we can recognise {3.18) as the equation for Brownian motion with drift, which 
implies the solution 
Y(t) = Yo + J.Lo(1- m)t + (1- m)aoWt. 
1 1 
Finally, using P(t) = [Y(t)er(1-m)t]r=;;; = ert[Y(t)]r=;;;, we can solve for the price P(t) as 
(3.19) 
where A = (m- 1)J.Lo and tc = !-'oU~m)" As in [94}, equation (8), (3.19) is intended 
to illustrate that in the deterministic case ao = 0 we have a finite-time singularity at a 
critical time tc determined by the initial conditions. Two further observations are also 
made by [94}. Firstly, they state that as the term in square brackets in (3.19) goes to 
zero the bubble price explodes and as a consequence of (3.10), so does the hazard rate. 
38 
Thus, as this happens a crash becomes more and more likely and the price is unable to 
grow without check. Secondly, under the dynamics given by (3.19), a crash is not a certain 
event and the price can also deflate spontaneously due to the random realisation of W(t) 
which can bring the term in the square brackets in (3.19) towards zero. 
Here, it is the form of (3.18) which allows us to construct the exact likelihood function. If 
we observe Yi from Y(t) at time i, the product of these transition densities for Y(t) can 
then be written as 
where P, = (1- m)J.Lo and a = 1(1 - m)lao. Using the transformation rule, we can write 
down the equation for the transition density of the observed prices Pi: 
(3.20) 
From (3.20}, the log-likelihood function for m> 1 can be written as 
n-1 ~ l(8IX) = --log(27r)- (n- 1) log( a)-m~ log(pi) + (n- 1) log( m- 1) 2 i=2 
n 1 n . . 2 
+r(m- 1) L i- 2-2 L (Pier(m-1)t- P,- Pi-Ier(m-I)(t-1)) . (3.21) 
i=2 0' i=2 
As it stands maximising (3.21) represents a four-dimensional problem. However, the form 
of the log-likelihood function is such that maximum likelihood estimates m and f are 
sufficient to determine the maximum likelihood estimates of P, and a and (3.21) reduces to 
a simple two-dimensional parameter search for m and f. Differentiating the log-likelihood 
in (3.21) with respect toP, and equating to zero, we see that 
n L (Pier(m-1)i- p,- Pi-1e"(m-I)(i-1)) = 0. 
i=2 
Similarly, differentiating with respect to a leaves us with 
leading to the nontrivial solution 
-2 _ 1 ~ ( . r(m-l)i _ - _ . r(m-l)(i-1)) 2 
a - ( ) ~ p,e J.L Pt-Ie . 
n -1 . 
2 t= 
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In conclusion, the major contribution of this subsection is the imposition of two 
identifiability constraints and a further reduction of the maximum likelihood problem 
to a two-dimensional parameter search. The combined effect is to allow practical and 
efficient calibration of the Sornette-Andersen model to empirical data and a refinement 
of the analysis in [2}. Further, (3.19) and the decomposition P(t) = B(t)ert suggest 
intersting ways of extending the original model (See Chapter 3.3). 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
Here, we choose our data analysis to coincide with [2}. We look at six markets which 
have previously been thought by analysts to incorporate bubbles. Data is from US$:DEM 
3/1/1983 to 8/3/1985, Nasdaq 18/6/1999 to 27/3/2000, S&P 500 1/7/1985 to 31/8/1987 
and 2/1/1991 to 4/9/1997 and the Hang Seng index (HSI) 2/1/1992 to 6/1/1994 and 
3/1/1995 to 3/10/1997. 
Suppose that we wish to conduct likelihood inference for nested hypotheses regarding a 
parameter 0. Suppose O' = (0~, 0~) where Ot has dimension p and fh has dimension p- q. 
We wish to test the hypothesis Ho : Ot = lh,o against the alternative H1 : 81 :f:Ot,O· Under 
appropriate regularity conditions, we have the following asymptotic result for n --+ oo: 
(3.22) 
where n denotes the number of the sample, l the log-likelihood function, and the hats 
denote maximum likelihood estimates. The fearless bubble model reduces to the Black-
Scholes model when B = 0. Thus we see that under the null hypothesis of the Black-Scholes 
model the likelihood ratio statistic in (3.22) should be approximately x§. Results for these 
tests are shown in Table 3.1. In each case we conclude that the fearless bubble does not 
offer a significant improvement over the Black-Scholes model and the SDE formulation 
(3.5) is rejected. 
Geometric Brownian Motion SEG diffusion X p-value 
US$:DEM 2213.137 2213.976 1.678 0.642 
Nasdaq -1077.357 -1077.045 0.624 0.891 
S&P 500 '87 -1189.802 -1189.535 0.534 0.919 
HSI '97 -4326.728 -4326.702 0.052 0.997 
HSI '94 -2985.627 -2984.016 3.222 0.359 
S&P 500 '97 -4539.082 -4537.959 2.246 0.523 
Table 3.1: Likelihood ratio tests: Geometric Brownian Motion vs. SEG diffusion 
In contrast, the fearful bubble model can be seen to provide a significant improvement over 
the Black-Scholes model (see Table 3.2). The Black-Scholes model is seen to reduce to the 
case that r = 0 and m = 1. We see that under the null hypothesis of the Black-SchoJ.es 
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model, the likelihood ratio statistic in {3.22) should be approximately X~· These results 
suggest that we have bubbles on all these markets with the exception of the Hang Seng 
between 1995 and 1997. After the rejecting the proposed fearless bubble model, we see 
that the main point of interest appears to be that the Sornette-Andersen is useful in its 
own right both as an empirically reasonable SDE model for financial bubbles and as an 
alternative to the ostensibly ODE approach of the JLS power-law model. 
Geometric Brownian Motion Sornette-Andersen X p-value 
US$:DEM 2213.137 2228.119 29.964 0.000*** 
Nasdaq -1077.357 -1073.183 8.348 0.015* 
S&P 500 '87 -1189.802 -1182.958 13.688 0.001 ** 
HSI '97 -4326.728 -4326.644 0.168 0.919 
HSI '94 -2985.627 -2978.439 14.376 0.0001 *** 
S&P 500 '97 -4539.082 -4502.044 74.076 0.000*** 
Table 3.2: Likelihood ratio tests: Geometric Brownian motion vs. Sornette-Andersen 
model 
3.3 Heavy-tailed extension of Sornette-Andersen model 
One of the key stylised empirical facts regarding financial markets, is the prevalence of 
heavy-tailed non-Gaussian phenomena, particularly, over short time scales. To illustrate 
this, Figure 3.1 is a plot of the log-densities of the log-returns on the S&P 500. We see that 
the tails of the Gaussian density are far too thin with respect to the non-parametric kernel 
density estimate, and we cannot justify empirically the choice of the normal distribution 
to. model the log-returns. In contrast, the fit of the symmetric hyperbolic distribution is 
seen to better replicate the empirically observed tail behaviour. 
The symmetric hyperbolic distribution h(a, &, JL) has density given by 
(3.23) 
where Kv is the Bessel function of the third kind defined by the formula 
( {5], Chapter 5, {106]). The distribution given by {3.23) has mean JL, and variance 
~ [~~~~~n. Instead of Brownian motion in the Sornette-Andersen model, we replace aWt 
by the Levy process Zt whose one-step transition densities are given by a symmetric 
hyperbolic distribution with zero mean {34]. Thus we are able to improve upon the 
Gaussian model by taking into account kurtosis (heavy-tails), although we retain the 
simplifying assumption of symmetry. In the· original Sornette-Andersen model, the 
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Figure 3.1: Plot of log-densities of log-returns on S&P 500. Solid line: non-parametric kde; 
dashed line: normal distribution; thin dashed line: symmetric hyperbolic distribution. 
equation for a "fundamental" regime corresponding to random variation about a simple 
geometric trend (m = 1, r = 0) is 
log(P(t)) = Const. + ji,t + uWt, (3.24) 
where P(t) denotes the price. In a bubble regime, the equation for the price becomes 
P(t) = ert (Const. + jlt + uWt)m~l . (3.25) 
Inserting a hyperbolic noise process, the model for fundamental "geometric" behaviour 
becomes 
log(P(t)) = Const. + jlt + Zt, (3.26) 
with uWt replaced by Zt. Similarly, we change the equation for a bubble to 
P(t) = ert (Const. + jlt + zt)-;;6. (3.27) 
(3.27) thus becomes our model for a bubble, with power-law behaviour emerging as a result 
of collective phenomena characterising a 'bubble regime' and generalising the more regular, 
approximately geometric, behaviour (3.26). From (3.23) the log-likelihood function for the 
geometric model (3.26) becomes 
n n 
-(n- 1) log(2&K1(8a))- L log(pi)- a L (&2 + (log(pi) -log(pi_1)- JL) 2) 1/2 . (3.28) 
i=2 i=2 
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Similarly, the log-likelihood for the model (3.27) becomes 
n 
l(8IX) = -(n- 1) log(2oK1(oa)) + (n- 1) log( m- 1)- m L log(pi) 
i=2 
where Pi denotes the observed price at time i. Here, (3.28) and (3.29) have to be maximised 
numerically. We test between the geometric behaviour (3.26) and the bubble model (3.27), 
by using the x2 test for nested models. 
The results using this test are shown in Table 3.3. This time we reject evidence of a bubble 
in the US$:DEM series. Moreover, the results in Table 3.3 are generally less significant 
than those shown in Table 3.2. This suggests that extending the original formulation by 
accounting for heavy-tailed non-Gaussian effects is successful in obtaining a more robust 
test for detecting bubbles in financial markets. 
Geometric Hyperbolic Model Sornette-Andersen X p-value 
US$:DEM 2369.954 2371.791 3.674 0.159 
Nasdaq -1077.152 -1073.184 7.936 0.019* 
S&P 500 '87 -1167.754 -1163.987 7.534 0.023* 
HSI '97 -4280.854 -4280.854 0.000 1.000 
HSI '94 -2954.711 -2948.239 12.944 0.002** 
S&P 500 '97 -4468.12 -4441.845 52.55 0.000*** 
Table 3.3: Likelihood ratio tests: Geometric Hyperbolic model vs. Hyperbolic Sornette-
Andersen model 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter we tested a proposed hierarchy; no bubble vs. fearful bubble vs. fearless 
bubble. The formulation of the fearful bubble model was rejected, but we were successful 
in refining the analysis of {2}, to provide maximum likelihood tests for a nonlinear SDE 
model of bubbles. In sum, rather than the proposed hierarchical structure, the main 
feature of interest appears to be the maximum likelihood estimation and tests for this 
nonlinear SDE model of bubbles. 
However, the original formulation of the model makes the assumption that the background 
driving noise is Gaussian, which is difficult to justify empirically (Figure 3.1). In Section 2 
we re-formulated the model using a hyperbolic process, {34}, in order to take into account 
heavy-tailed non-Gaussian effects in financial markets. Results for the Sornette-Andersen 
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model using the original Gaussian formulation and the new hyperbolic formulation are 
both interesting, but the hyperbolic formulation appears to be an improvement and seems 
more robust. In sum, using the results obtained in Section 3, we conclude in favour of 
bubbles on the Nasdaq 18/6/1999 to 27/3/2000, S&P 500 1/7/1985 to 31/8/1987 and 
2/1/1991 to 4/9/1997, and the HSI 2/1/1992 to 6/1/1994. We suggest the absence 
of bubbles in the US$:DEM series 3/1/1983 to 8/3/1985 and in the HSI 3/1/1995 to 
3/10/1997. 
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Chapter 4 
Volatility and liquidity precursors 
The aim of this chapter is to examine to what extent volatility and liquidity measures may 
help to predict financial crashes, and attempt to use these measures to draw meaningful 
economic conclusions. Volatility is a statistical measure of the fluctuations prevalent 
in a stock price, and is taken here to be equal to the empirical standard deviation of 
the log-returns. Liquidity is a rather general concept from economics. Market liquidity 
corresponds to the ability to quickly buy and sell assets, without causing a significant 
movement in price. In liquid markets cash flows freely, and options and other financial 
instruments are relatively easy to price. In contrast, in illiquid markets the flow of money 
is more constricted and single trades may move the price significantly. Illiquid markets 
might correspond to markets under strain and about to crash. In this chapter we consider 
various measures of liquidity. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 1 is an introduction, giving a brief 
review of the literature and describing the various liquidity measures used. Section 2 is 
an exploratory data analysis. Of direct interest here is the analogy between stock market 
crashes and complex systems. Section 3 tests for the significance of precursors, using a 
novel regression application of the Sornette-Andersen model introduced in the previous 
chapter. Results are seen to offer an improvement over a nonlinear regression application 
of the SEG model in Chapter 2. Section 4 explores possible evidence of phase transitions 
in trading volume and liquidity. Section 5 is a conclusion. 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Literature review 
The comment is made in {64] that some kind of volatility-based method may produce a 
more econometrically interpretable way of predicting crashes than the log-periodic method 
45 
of Sornette and Johansen. With this aim at least partially in mind, [39] includes a graph 
of the standard deviation of the log-returns of the S&P 500 over a moving window of fifty 
trading days from January 1980 to October 1987. Somewhat disappointingly, the results 
seem to show little more than periodic variation. The comment is made in [102] that 
volatility is a purely statistical measure of market fluctuations and hence does not possess a 
meaningful economic interpretation. Moreover, given the apparent long-range dependence 
in volatility, [102] makes the point that volatility tends to lag behind price. Thus, using 
volatility measures, there might be a delay while information signifying that a crash may 
be imminent is incorporated. Hence volatility may not even be the right thing to look 
at. The relevant concept would then seem to be liquidity rather than volatility. This 
point seems to be echoed somewhat by [22]. Here, rather than discussing volatility, the 
comment is made (Chapter 7, page 126) that crashes are known to correspond to illiquid 
markets where the bid-ask spread increases and the trading volume becomes depleted. 
4.1.2 Liquidity measures 
Given the above comments by [22], there are two relatively straightforward measures of 
liquidity. In particular, we use the logarithm of the trading volume and the relative daily 
spread (RDS). The RDS is defined by 
ln(Pmax) -ln(Pmin), 
where Pmax and Pmin denote the day's maximum price, and the day's minimum price 
respectively. There are two further liquidity proxies that we introduce. [102] makes 
the comment that [1] and [63} measure market liquidity using the coefficient >. in the 
regression 
Pt = Pt-1 + >.Qt + tt, (4.1) 
where Pt denotes the price, Qt the trading volume at time t and tt is a zero mean error 
term. Since the notion of a negative liquidity does not seem economically reasonable, (4.1) 
motivates the following linear liquidity proxy: 
, _ IPt- Pt-1l 
1\t- Qt . (4.2) 
Now (4.2) measures daily liquidity as the number of trades it takes to shift the price by 
one unit. High values should thus correspond to illiquid markets, as single trades thus 
cause a greater movement in the underlying price. However, [102] makes the comment 
that (4.1) and hence (4.2) are essentially measured in an arbitrary scale as price differences 
tend to be nominally larger for higher stock prices. What arguably makes more sense is a 
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measure of relative change. As such, Tsuji replaces (4.1) by 
(4.3) 
where rt denotes the log-return at time t, rt = log(Pt+d - log(Pt), and ft is again a 
zero-mean error term. ( 4.3) then suggests the following logarithmic measure of liquidity: 
(4.4) 
4.2 Exploratory Data Analysis 
4.2.1 Volatility 
Here we define volatility as the standard deviation of the log-returns calculated over a 
moving time window of 50 days. The results are shown in Figure 4.1. There is some 
suggestion that volatility might be increasing as the crash time approaches. This is quite 
clear cut for the Nasdaq, but is less obvious for the S&P 500 and the Hang Seng, where 
results do seem subject to quite considerable cyclic variations. Further, the scales on the 
Y-axes in Figure 4.1 suggest that the Nasdaq is a more volatile market than the S&P 500. 
This is perhaps to be expected since the Nasdaq consists of more 'new economy' stocks, 
which are usually thought to be more volatile. 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Time Time 
Figure 4.1: Historical volatilities for the S&P 500 (left panel) and for the Nasdaq (right 
panel). 
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4.2.2 Trading volume 
Unfortunately, trading volume figures were available only for the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq. 
As one might expect, the trading volume decreases as the crash time approaches. The 
picture obtained is qualitatively similar for both the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq. It seems 
reasonable to try to fit a simple power-law model to the logarithm of the trading volume. 
However, some level of cyclic behaviour in the trading volumes is also apparent (see Figure 
4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: Plot of Log(Trading Volume) for S&P 500 and OLS fit by simple power-law 
model 
4.2.3 Relative Daily Spread 
The RDS values seem to be generally decreasing as the crash time approaches. This 
feature seems quite clear for the Nasdaq, though somewhat less clear for both the S&P500 
and Hang Seng indices (see Figure 4.3). 
4.2.4 Linear liquidity measure 
In this section we examine the linear liquidity proxy given by (4.2). In the absence of 
available trading volume data for the Hang Seng index, we concentrate attention on the 
Nasdaq and S&P 500 indices. It seems rather less obvious to identify a smooth underlying 
trend for the S&P 500, although generally increasing values do suggest some enhanced 
illiquidity as the crash time approaches. However, when we look at the Nasdaq we have 
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Figure 4.3: RDS from 4th March to 31st March 2000 for the Nasdaq and from 1st December 
1989 to 31st December 1993 for the Hang Seng 
a clear suggestion of approximate power-law behaviour. This illustrates a substantial 
increase in illiquidity prior to the crash, and the approximate power-law behaviour 
highlights the analogy between complex systems and financial markets (see Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4: Plot of linear liquidity measures for S&P 500 and Nasdaq 
4.2.5 Logarithmic liquidity measure 
The results for the logarithmic liquidity measures seem a little harder to interpret than was 
the case for the linear liquidity measures (Figure 4.5). There seems to be some evidence 
of increased illiquidity on the Nasdaq as the crash time approaches, but it appears less 
easy to identify a smooth underlying trend. In contrast, it is not clear that these values 
are generally increasing for the S&P 500 index. 
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Figure 4.5: Plot of logarithmic liquidity measures for S&P 500 and Nasdaq 
4.3 Significance of precursors 
In the Gaussian formulation of the Sornette-Andersen model we have that y(t) = 
p(t)1-mer(m-1)t is Brownian motion with drift. We can use this result to produce a 
regression test to determine which factors are significant once we take into account super-
exponential growth. This approach is seen to avoid problems with a nonlinear regression 
approach using the SEG model in Chapter 2, which is too sensitive to the effects of 
correlated random error terms. 
Consider a series Xt. Let y(t) = p(t) 1-mer(m-l)t and D.y(t) = Yt - Yt-1· Under the 
Sornette-Andersen model we have 
t 
Yt = A + J..d + L €i' 
i=1 
(4.5) 
where A is a constant independent of time and the €i are an i.i.d. sequence from N(O, a 2 ). 
Suppose we build on (4.5) and consider the model 
t 
Yt = A + J..d + L €i + "fXt. 
i=l 
The corresponding condition at time t - 1 is 
t-1 
Yt-1 =A+ J.L(t- 1) + L €i + "fXt-1· 
i=1 
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(4.6) 
(4.7) 
Subtracting (4.7) from (4.6), we obtain 
(4.8) 
( 4.8) suggests that we may test the hypothesis 'Y = 0 by fitting a simple OLS regression 
of Ayt against Axt. We report results for each of the three markets before we present a 
brief comparison with a nonlinear regression formulation using the SEG model of Chapter 
2. In addition to considering the instantaneous-effects model of ( 4.6), we also consider a 
lag-1 version of this model whereby variables influence the price one day in advance. The 
condition ( 4.6) becomes 
t 
Yt =A+ J.t(t) + L ii + 'YXt-1, 
i=2 
and the regression equation (4.8) is replaced by 
Extensions to other lagged regression are possible but seem less relevant. 
4.3.1 S&P 500 
(4.9) 
Here we fit the models using data from September 4th 1984 to September 30th 1987. The 
results are shown in Table 4.1. In addition to the super-exponential growth (SEG) model 
shown in (4.10), regressors used are volatility (vol.), log trading volume (LTV), relative 
daily spread (RDS), linear liquidity measure (linliq.), and logarithmic liquidity measure 
{logliq.). Once we take into account super-exponential growth the only factors that remain 
significant are historical volatility and the logarithmic liquidity measure. Thus, we have 
some evidence to support the hypothesis that crashes occur on volatile, illiquid markets. 
Further, the logarithmic liquidity measure seems useful in generalising the purely linear 
measure of liquidity, which is found to be non-significant for both the contemporaneous 
regression (4.8) and the lag-1 regression (4.9). The results for the Nasdaq are shown in 
the next subsection. 
Variable Contemporaneous p-value lag-1 p-value 
Historical volatility 0.000*** 0.009** 
Log trading volume 0.134 0.936 
Relative daily spread 0.128 0.867 
Linear liquidity measure 0.361 0.189 
Logarithmic liquidity measure 0.002** 0.051 (·) 
Table 4.1: Results for the S&P 500 
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4.3.2 Nasdaq 
Here we fit the models using data from 3rd March 1997 to 31st March 2000. The results 
for the N asdaq index are shown in Table 4.2. We have some suggestion that crashes occur 
on volatile, illiquid markets, as volatility and the logarithmic and linear liquidity measures 
are significant under the instant-effects model ( 4.8) and volatility and logarithmic liquidity 
remain significant or borderline significant under the lag-1 model (4.9). We also have some 
evidence that the nature of the illiquidity on the N asdaq prior to the 2000 crash is different 
in nature to the illiquidity present on the S&P 500 prior to the 1987 crash, as different 
variables are significant once we account for super-exponential growth. 
Variable Contemporaneous p-value lag-1 p-value 
Historical volatility 0.000*** 0.001** 
Log trading volume 0.668 0.471 
Relative daily spread 0.822 0.524 
Linear liquidity measure 0.011* 0.573 
Logarithmic liquidity measure 0.002*** 0.079 (·) 
Table 4.2: Results for the Nasdaq 
4.3.3 Hang Seng 
Here we fit the models using data from 4th December 1990 to 31st December 1993. The 
results for the Hang Seng index are shown in Table 4.3. Here, once we account for super-
exponential growth and using the instant effects model (4.8), the historical volatility is 
found to be significant whilst the relative daily spread is found to be non-significant. In 
contrast, using the lag-1 model (4.9), neither term is found to be significant. This result 
leads us to conclude that the nature of the illiquidity present on the Hang Seng index 
prior to the 1994 crash is different in nature to that present on the Nasdaq,prior to the 
crash in April 2000 and on the S&P 500 prior to the crash in 1987. 
Variable Contemporaneous p-value lag-1 p-value 
Historical volatility 0.000*** 0.472 
Relative daily spread 0.170 0.804 
Table 4.3: Results for the Hang Seng 
4.3.4 Comparison with a simple nonlinear regression approach 
In Chapter 2 we introduced the SEG model, which stated that in the regime prior to a 
financial crash, the log-price y should satisfy 
(4.10) 
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where the fi is a zero mean error term. We now test for the significance of each of the 
precursors x by fitting the model 
(4.11) 
estimating (4.10) and (4.11) using ordinary least squares. We might test for the significance 
of possible crash precursors by using approximate F-tests based on the extra sum-of-
squares principle for nested models (see for example Chapter 3 in [13/). There is some 
similarity between this approach and the simple regression analysis contained in [109}. 
However, we note from Figure 2.6 in Chapter 2 that the residuals for this model are 
highly correlated. We obtain different results for this simple approach assuming ordinary 
least squares and our novel eo-integration approach given by (4.8). We conclude that 
model violation, namely serially correlated residuals, mean that the results suggested by 
this simple approach are not valid. Tables 4.4-4.6 summarise the results. The results for 
the Hang Seng return the same conclusions as the previous section, but we note some 
differences for the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq. In particular, the simple ordinary least 
squares approach seems to overlook the impact of volatility and logarithmic liquidity for 
the S&P 500, and seems to exaggerate the significance of RDS for the Nasdaq. 
Model SEG +vol. SEG + LTV SEG + RDS SEG + linliq. SEG + logliq. 
RSS 1.129 1.110 1.129 1.127 1.128 
SEG RSS 1.129 1.129 1.129 1.129 1.129 
Extra SS 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.001 
RMS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
F-value 0.363 13.742 0.391 1.656 0.794 
P-value 0.547 0.000*** 0.531 0.198 0.373 
Table 4.4: SEG nested models comparisons for S&P 500 
Model SEG +vol. SEG + LTV SEG + RDS SEG + linliq. SEG + logliq. 
RSS 4.005 4.458 4.432 4.217 4.250 
SEG RSS 4.463 4.463 4.463 4.463 4.463 
Extra SS 0.458 0.006 0.031 0.247 0.213 
RMS 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
F-value 88.499 1.001 5.429 45.253 38.857 
P-value 0.000*** 0.317 0.020* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Table 4.5: SEG nested models comparisons for Nasdaq 
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Model SEG + volatility SEG + RDS 
RSS 2.996 3.214 
SEG RSS 3.219 3.219 
Extra SS 0.222 0.004 
RMS 0.004 0.004 
F-value 55.046 1.014 
P-value 0.000*** 0.314 
Table 4.6: SEG nested models comparisons for Hang Seng 
4.4 Crash prediction using method of critical points 
In this section we fit the simple power-law model, 
y(t) =A+ B(tc- t)a, (4.12) 
by ordinary least squares to time series of log trading volume and the linear liquidity 
measure. Our aim is to see whether this admittedly simple-minded approximation seems 
able to predict the time of the crashes studied. Here we are trying to link the tc parameter 
-the time when the market is deemed most susceptible to a crash- to meaningful economic 
variables. In so doing we are exploring, quantitatively, the analogy between market crashes 
and phase transitions in statistical mechanics (as discussed in earlier chapters). 
4.4.1 Log trading volume 
For ease of computation we fit ( 4.12) to the logarithm of the trading volume for the S&P 
500. Here, we fit the model using simple ordinary least squares. The fit of the power-law 
seems reasonable, see Figure 4.2, and gives an R2 value of 60.8%. However there are 
clear suggestions that there appear to be roughly cyclic fluctuations in the logarithm of 
the trading volume series that this simple model is unable to account for. Results are 
sufficient to suggest there may be at least some similarities between stock market crashes 
and phase transitions in complex systems although estimated standard errors, obtained 
using a bootstrap test based on 10,000 simulated values, are rather large. Here, since the 
the estimate of tc is so close to the sampled dates, a near singularity occurs in the observed 
Fisher's Information matrix. Nonetheless, the bootstrap test leads to a p-value of 0.00 that 
B is non-zero. An F-test based on the extra sum of squares principle gives a p-value of 
0.000, suggesting a significant improvement over the simple model y(t) = A+ ft. The 
predicted crash time corresponds to the beginning of October 1987, though the estimated 
standard error associated with this estimate is rather large. The regression results in Table 
4.1, suggest that log trading volume is non-significant once we take into account super-
exponential growth. However, the analogy between phase transitions and market crashes 
is brought out rather better by results for the Nasdaq index in the next subsection. 
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Parameter Estimate ( e.s.e) 
A 18.248 (0.085) 
B 1.844 * w-5 (1.287 * w-5 ) 
tc 1031.0 (437.302) 
a 1.548 (0.446) 
Table 4.7: Results for power-law model fitted to the logarithm of the trading volume for 
S&P 500 
4.4.2 Linear liquidity measure 
On the basis of Figure 4.4, we fit the simple power law model to the time series of linear 
liquidity measures for the Nasdaq index only. In line with the plot obtained, the fit of this 
model is good. This time the fit of the model is improved, estimated standard errors are 
much reduced and the analogy with phase transitions in statistical mechanics is brought 
out more clearly. Further, from Table 4.2 we see that the linear liquidity measure is 
also seen to remain significant once we take into account super exponential growth. The 
predicted crash time corresponds to early May 2000, with an estimated standard error of 
around 4 trading days. Results obtained are shown in Table 4.8. The negative a exponent 
indicates explosive growth, with the market becoming increasingly illiquid as the crash 
approaches. 
Parameter Estimate (e.s.e.) 
A -4.610 * 10 -5 (4.546 * w-ti) 
B 6.469 * w-5 (4.374 * w-6 ) 
tc 1058.237 (3. 733) 
a -0.047 (0.004) 
Table 4.8: Results for power-law model for linear liquidity measure for Nasdaq 
4.5 Conclusions 
From the statistical analysis in Section 4 we have at least some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that crashes occur on volatile, illiquid markets. This feature holds for all three 
markets examined even after we take into account super-exponential growth (SEG). The 
analysis in Section 4 also suggests differences in the precise form of illiquidity on these 
markets. This might be anticipated from the general context, although it is interesting 
that our novel eo-integrated regression approach can nonetheless return this interpretation. 
This approach, based on the Sornette-Andersen model, is also seen to offer an improvement 
over a simple F-tests based on the extra sum of squares principle under the assumption 
of ordinary least squares. 
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In addition to a purely statistical analysis, we have also explored the analogy between 
stock markets and complex systems. In particular, the simple power-law model of Section 
4 produces interesting results when applied to (a) the S&P 500 crash of 1987 and (b) the 
Nasdaq crash of 2000 when 
(a) applied to the log-trading volume, 
(b) applied to the linear liquidity measure introduced in Section 2. 
The suggestion is that there is at least some evidence for phase transition behaviour in real 
economic variables prior to crashes and scope for an economically meaningful prediction 
mechanism, though the evidence in support of this is much stronger for the Nasdaq than 
for the S&P 500. 
One of the key themes of [102} is that using liquidity measures, risk-management may 
switch focus from the purely statistical notion of volatility to measures with a more 
meaningful economic interpretation. Here, our statistical analysis reinforces the view 
that liquidity is indeed an important notion, with results suggesting interesting ways to 
incorporate the notion of liquidity into our modelling. 
Based upon the results of this chapter, we may extend the conclusions of the previous 
chapter slightly. In order to predict a crash we anticipate super-exponential growth, 
accompanied by some additional signals of illiquidity. The various liquidity measures 
considered here suggest close analogies between market crashes and complex systems, 
with liquidity measures seen to remain significant even after taking into account super-
exponential growth. We discuss prediction and detection methodologies using these results 
in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Simple models for bubbles: a 
synthesis 
In this chapter, we attempt to synthesise Chapters 2-4 and provide a robust mechanism 
for detecting bubbles in financial markets. In particular, we use the previous chapter's 
hyperbolic re-formulation of the Sornette-Andersen model to test for bubbles. If the 
Sornette-Andersen model is found to be significant we can then use the SEG model of 
Chapter 2, and the empirical power-laws of Chapter 3 to predict the most likely time of a 
crash. In sum, our methodology follows the heuristic shown in Figure 5.1. See Section 4. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 1, based on original analysis in 
{93} Chapter 7, we discuss tests for super-exponential bubbles in foreign exchange (FX) 
markets. In Section 2 we discuss two historically observed log-periodic "false-alarms" as 
identified in {93}, Chapter 9. For comparison with the analysis in Section 2, we discuss a 
regime-switching regression model presented in [103}, and find some degree of agreement 
between interpretation of results in Section 2 and this regime-switching regression model. 
Finally, in Section 4 we discuss a case study to illustrate the approach suggested by Figure 
5.1 in order to predict crashes. Section 5 is a brief conclusion. 
5.1 SEG bubbles in FX markets 
The use of log-periodic predictions is mentioned in [93}, Chapter 7, in relation to detecting 
speculative bubbles in the world's FX markets. {93} concludes that there is evidence of 
two speculative bubbles in the US$. The first one ending in March 1985 and the second 
one in August 1998, both after periods of strong growth in the preceding years. Closely 
following the methodology in {93} we look at two sets of data, one immediately preceding 
March 1985 and one immediately preceding August 1998. We take the price of the US$ as 
y(t)=US$ expressed in Deutchmarks (DEM) for the first period and y(t)=US$ expressed 
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Figure 5.1: Suggested crash prediction methodology 
in Canadian dollars (CAD) in the second period. Based on the results for the SEG model 
in Chapter 2 Section 4 we restrict attention to a single four-year period before the crash, 
stopping roughly a month prior to the observed crash. We analyse data from February 
1st 1981 to February 28th 1985 and from July 1st 1994 to July 31st 1998. Results using 
the x2 test for SEG bubbles are shown in Table 5.1. We have evidence for a bubble prior 
to 1985, but we reject the presence of a bubble prior to 1998. The results for the fitted 
SEG model are shown in Table 5.2. The estimated crash time corresponds to mid-August 
1985, with an estimated standard error of 17 days. A plot of the fit obtained is shown in 
Figure 5.2, and appears reasonable. 
Geometric Hyperbolic Model Sornette-Andersen X p-value 
US$:DEM 4375.153 4385.677 21.048 0.000*** 
US$:CAD 6855.384 6857.438 4.108 0.128 
Table 5.1: Likelihood ratio tests: Geometric Hyperbolic model vs. Hyperbolic Sornette-
Andersen model 
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Parameter Estimate (e.s.e) 
A 2.051 (0.040) 
r 0.000 (0.000) 
c -0.167 (0.005) 
tc 1656.534 (17.076) 
Table 5.2: Results for SEG model on US$:DEM series 
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Figure 5.2: Plot of Log(US$:DEM) and best fit of SEG model 
5.2 Log-periodic false predictions 
Two log-periodic false predictions are listed in {93]. Firstly, after using data from the S&P 
500 up to Friday, November 21st, 1997, {93], Chapter 9 Page 342, describes a prediction 
of "a decrease in the price in approximately mid-December 1997". Similarly, later on in 
the same chapter and using data to the end of September 1999, a prediction is made of 
a bubble on the Nasdaq due to end in October 1999. {93] goes on to describe this as 
"an aborted event, which turned into a precursor of the large crash in April 2000". x2 
tests are highly significant, indicating the presence of a bubble in both cases. See Table 
5.3. Results for the SEG model of Chapter 2 are shown in Table 5.4. The predicted 
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crash-time for the S&P 500 corresponds to mid-July 1999, roughly 9 months in advance of 
the April2000 crash on the Nasdaq and some way after the initial prediction of December 
1997. For the Nasdaq index, the predicted crash-time corresponds to early April 2000, 
very close to the actual timing of the crash. We might suggest that although some level 
of unstable price acceleration is present, the bubble has not yet reached its most explosive 
phase when a crash is imminent. We are able to obtain a similar picture by considering 
a simple regime-switching model in the next section. A plot of the fit obtained from the 
SEG model is shown in Figure 5.3 and appears reasonable. 
Geometric Hyperbolic Model Sornette-Andersen X p-value 
S&P 500 -2954.055 -2911.215 85.68 0.000*** 
Nasdaq -4580.372 -4552.742 55.26 0.000*** 
Table 5.3: Likelihood ratio tests: Geometric Hyperbolic model vs. Hyperbolic Sornette-
Andersen model 
Parameter S&P 500 Nasdaq 
A 11.152 (0.172) 8.934 (0.466) 
r 0.000 (0.000) 4.751 * 10-4 (6.498 * 10-5) 
c -0.699 (0.022) -0.286 (0.064) 
tc 1456.178 (25.082) 1182.665 ( 46.910) 
Table 5.4: Results for SEG model on S&P 500 and N asdaq 
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Figure 5.3: Fit of SEG model. Left panel: S&P 500. Right panel: Nasdaq. 
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5.3 Comparison with a regime-switching regression model 
Regime-switching regression models are a valuable tool in providing a simple statistical 
approach to answer questions like "To what extent does the stock market appear to deviate 
from a fundamental price?", and "What is the probability of a stock market crash next 
month?" These models, as formulated in {103] and {23], require a decomposition of 
the price of a dividend paying stock into a bubble component and a fundamental price 
component. Here, we take "fundamental value" to mean price levels that would appear 
reasonable given observed dividend payments Dt at time t. Thus, we have 
(5.1) 
where Bt denotes the bubble price at time t, Pt denotes the observed price at time t, 
and Pt is the fundamental price at time t. We define the relative bubble size bt = Btf Pt 
and the returns Rt+l = (Pt+l + Dt+I)/ Pt. The simplest way to construct fundamental 
values is to use Pt = pDt, for some constant p. In empirical work p is estimated by the 
mean price-dividend ratio. This approach is considered by both {103] and [23]. Both 
papers also consider a more complicated vector autoregressive method, described in {25], 
to achieve this fundamental value-bubble decomposition. However, both [103] and [23] 
report that results seem to be similar for the two methods. 
Both [103] and [23] apply regime-switching regression models to financial markets, with 
modelling of stock market crashes in mind. Essentially the message of these papers is 
some suggestion of predictability in stock market returns. Here, we focus on the simpler 
van Norden-Schaller model {103]. We have two regimes, a speculative regime S, and a 
collapsing bubble regime C. The transition from the speculative bubble regime to the 
collapsing bubble regime corresponds to a crash, with expected returns higher in regime 
S. The model of Brooks and Katsaris {23] is more complicated as it includes a third 
'dormant' regime D, within which the bubble is expected to grow at a constant rate 
rather than simply at an explosive rate. {23] also allow the probability of switching 
between these three regimes to depend on abnormal trading volume, rather than in {103] 
where the switching probabilities depend only on the absolute relative size of the bubble. 
Here, we refer to {103], particularly the calculations given in the appendix, for details of 
the derivation both of the simple method used to construct fundamental prices and the 
original formulation of their switching regression model. For the sake of completeness we 
provide details of both derivations in Appendix B. 
As a purely statistical formulation of the model, {103] use 
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Rt+liC = f3co + f3cbbt + EC,t+l• 
qt+l = 4_)(f3qO + /3qblbti), (5.2) 
where 4_)(-) denotes the standard normal CDF. Given that we are in the speculative stateS 
at time t, qt+ 1 ( ·) denotes the probability of remaining in S at time t + 1. This formulation 
of the model ensures that the estimated q-probabilities lie in the range [0, 1]. /3qb is 
constrained to be negative so that as bt increases, the probability of a crash becomes 
more likely. Further, we see that in this simple model the probability of a market crash 
depends solely on the relative bubble size bt. We have the additional constraint f3sb > f3cb, 
which is intuitive as this suggests higher average returns when in the speculative phase. 
The ES,t and EC,t terms are assumed to be independent sequences of normal white noise 
errors. Here, since the data analysed was low-frequency monthly data, there was very 
little suggestion of heavy-tailed non-Gaussian behaviour. Given the normality of the £, 
the likelihood function can be calculated as 
l(8lX) = il [ 4_)(f3qo + /3qblbtl)4> ( Rt+l - ~:- f3sbbt) u:Sl 
+ 4_)( -/3qo- /3qblbtl)4> ( Rt+l - /3:; - f3cbbt) uc:l], (5.3) 
where 4> denotes the density of a N(O, 1) random variable. One of the attractive features 
of the van Norden-Schaller model is that it enables one to construct one-step-ahead 
probabilities of stock market crashes or stock market rallies. For a given K we can calculate 
For K = ILRt±2uRt (5.4) is given the interpretation by van Norden and Schaller as the 
probability of a market rally or the probability of a market crash. The data analysed 
are from R. J. Shiller's webpage http:jjwww.econ.yalej"'shillerjdata.html and constitute 
monthly values for the S&P 500 index and the associated dividend component from 
January 1980 to June 2007, standardised using the consumer price index. Maximum 
likelihood estimates, obtained using the Nelder-Mead method, are shown in Table 5.5, 
and seem broadly consistent with those given in Tables 1 and 2 of {103}. Estimated 
standard errors are also given and were calculated from the square root of the diagonal 
entries of the observed Fisher's information matrix. Here the observed Fisher's information 
matrix was calculated numerically using a finite difference method- the function fdHess 
in R. 
Using (5.4) and K = ILRt - 2uRt we can calculate the one-step ahead probabilities of a 
market crash as shown in Figure 5.4. According to this interpretation, the probability of a 
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Parameter Estimate Estimated Standard Error 
J3so 1.032 0.002 
J3sb -0.023 0.004 
J3co 1.011 0.014 
J3cb -0.027 0.014 
/3qo 1.517 0.350 
/3qb -1.110 0.444 
us 0.026 0.002 
uc 0.061 0.009 
Table 5.5: Results for Regime-Switching Regression Model 
market crash has increased from 1995 onwards as stock prices seem to have diverged from 
values which would appear reasonable given the dividend. These results fail to predict the 
crash of 1987, but peak sharply from 1995 until the crash in internet stocks in early 2000. 
The probability of a market crash seems to have generally decreased from initial highs in 
the early 2000's, despite an increase in 2003. However, the probability of a market crash 
remains higher than pre-1995 levels . 
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Figure 5.4: One-step-ahead probability of a market crash using monthly data for the 
S&P500. 
5.3.1 Comparison with SEG models/log-periodicity 
From Figure 5.4 the probability of a market crash is seen to increase from 1995 until 
2000, around the time of the crash in internet stocks. Thus, under this interpretation, it 
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is perhaps to be expected that we may find empirical evidence for SEG or log-periodic 
precursors from 1995 onwards as the probability of a market crash increases. However, 
it does appear that the inherent risks peak around April 2000, and not at the earlier 
times indicated in {99]. This coincides with the interpretation from the previous section 
that there is some suggestion of a bubble from around 1998, but that the probability of a 
market crash peaks in 2000. 
5.4 Case study: How to predict crashes if you really must 
In this section we give a rough guide on how one might try to predict crashes. For the 
~uggested methodology we refer to Figure 5.1. The key advantage over the raw log-periodic 
methodology is that here we are trying to base predictions both on a formal statistical 
hypothesis test, and also on more interpretable econometric features, namely measures of 
liquidity closely associated with the trading volume. 
In order to provide greater clarity and as an accompaniment to Figure 5.1, pseudocode 
for the proposed prediction methodology is shown below: 
1. Test for bubble using the hyperbolic formulation of the Sornette-Andersen model. If 
non-significant stop. 
2. If the test in 1. is significant, test for super exponential growth using the JLS power 
law model and (2.18). If non-significant stop. 
3. If 1-2 significant search for empirical power laws in liquidity measures, particularly 
those linked to trading volume. 
4. If the fit in 3. is significant, use the estimate and estimated standard error for tc found 
in 3. Else, the optimal predictions are those found in step 2. 
5.4.1 Case study 
In this section we look at the Dow Jones Industrial Average index prior to the 1987 crash 
and the Nasdaq 100 index prior to the April2000 crash on the Nasdaq. For both indices we 
find strong evidence for super-exponential growth (see Table 5.6). However, for the DJIA 
we do not find any power law type behaviour in any of the liquidity measures introduced 
in Chapter 3. Thus, we are constrained to a prediction of tc = 1215.295 (towards the 
end of June 1988) based on the fit obtained by the SEG model (Table 5.7). A plot of 
the fit obtained is shown in Figure 5.5, and appears reasonable. For the Nasdaq 100 
index, we also have some evidence of power law behaviour in the logarithm of trading 
volume. A power law fit, as shown by Figure 5.6, seems reasonable. This model has 
an R2 value of 77.8% and an F-test based on the extra sum of squares principle gives a 
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p-value of 0.000, suggesting a significant improvement on the simple model y(y) =A+ £t. 
Further, the cointegrated regression tests of Chapter 4 give p-values of 0.089 and 0.957. 
This borderline significant p-value of 0.089 for the contemporaneous regression gives at 
least some suggestion that log trading volume remains significant even after we take into 
account super exponential growth. Further, the fit of the empirical power law to the log 
trading volume leads us to a prediction of tc = 1053.575 corresponding to early May 2000. 
Tabulated results for the Nasdaq 100 index are shown in Table 5.8. The best fit of the 
SEG model seems reasonable (Figure 5.6). However, the SEG model leads to an estimate 
of tc = 1095.195 corresponding to the end of June 2000, roughly two months behind the 
prediction of the empirical power law. 
Geometric Hyperbolic Model Sornette-Andersen X p-value 
DJIA -4097.661 -4089.944 15.434 0.000*** 
Nasdaq -4787.48 -4757.429 60.102 0.000*** 
Table 5.6: Likelihood ratio tests: Geometric Hyperbolic model vs. Hyperbolic Sornette-
Andersen model 
Parameter Estimate (e.s.e) 
A 10.600 (0.102) 
r 0.000 (0.000) 
c -0.507 (0.014) 
tc 1215.295 (12.940) 
Table 5.7: Results for SEG model on DJIA 
Model SEG Empirical (log trading volume) 
A 9.738 (0.271) 23.067 (1.048) 
r 6.855 * 10-4 (5.184 * w-5 ) 
c -0.4 71 (0.038) -0.981 (0.763) 
tc 1095.195 (10.403) 1053.575 (11.316) 
a 0.160 (0.062) 
Table 5.8: Results for power-law models for the Nasdaq 100 index 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have used a formal statistical hypothesis test, based on the hyperbolic 
Sornette-Andersen model of Chapter 3, to refine the statistical analysis of cited instances 
of log-periodic precursors previously discussed in {93]. In Section 1, we found strong 
evidence of a bubble in the US$:DEM series, but found no evidence for a bubble in the 
US$:CAD series. In Section 2 we analysed two log-periodic false predictions in {93]. We 
found strong evidence for a bubble in each of these two cases, but found that the original 
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Figure 5.6: Left panel: Fit of SEG model to Nasdaq 100. Right panel: Fit of empirical 
power-law to log trading volume 
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crash-time estimates given in [93} are too early. In contrast, both our SEG model and 
the regime-switching regression model of {103} suggest that the level of risk appears to 
peak around the time of the actual crash on the Nasdaq- April 2000. In Section 4 we 
discussed a prediction methodology, and as a case study discussed the DJIA prior to Black 
Monday, October 19th 1987, and the Nasdaq 100 index prior to the crash in internet stocks 
in April 2000. x2 tests were highly significant, suggesting strong evidence of a bubble in 
both cases. The method led to predictions of June 1988 ± 26 days (Oct. 1987 crash) and 
early May 2000 ± 30 days (April 2000 crash), which seem reasonable. In addition, we 
found further evidence to support the analogy with phase transitions in complex systems 
and stock market crashes, with an empirical power-law providing a reasonable fit to a 
log-trading volume series. 
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Chapter 6 
A universal power-law for 
drawdowns and models for 
external/internal origins of crises 
In Section 1 we discuss drawdowns {55]. Expanding on the original calculations in 
the appendix of this paper, we are able to derive a generalised Pareto distribution for 
drawdowns. Thus we are able to show that contrary to the title of {55], rather than being 
outliers large drawdowns in fact obey a universal power law. In Section 2 we introduce 
a model of exogenous and endogenous shocks in complex systems (95]. In Section 3 we 
discuss the multifractal random walk model {79], {8]. Our particular interest is the 
approach taken by {100}, which attempts to relate volatility decay following a particular 
crises to an endogenous or exogenous cause. The hypothesis of {100} is that it should 
be possible to indicate an endogenous/exogenous root to a crisis by the exponent of the 
observed power-law decay of volatility. In Section 4 we provide an empirical investigation 
of this model. It is found that there is at least some evidence to support the hypothesis 
of {100}. However, it seems the observed power law exponents violate the predictions 
of this model. In Section 5 we show that the empirical results are more consistent with 
a fractional Gaussian noise model presented in {95]. Under this model not only can we 
derive exponents corresponding to an exogenous shock, but we are able to extend the 
original approach and derive the power law exponent corresponding to an endogenous 
shocks. Results for the fractional Gaussian noise model are seen to show a reasonable 
agreement with the empirical data. Finally, Section 6 is a brief conclusion. 
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6.1 Universal power law for drawdowns in an exponential 
Levy market 
Drawdowns are a measure of the percentage fall in the underlying price from one local 
maximum t1 to the local minimum t2, where t2 is the lowest value the price takes before 
rising again. Drawdowns are of interest because they are more informative than simply 
recording the values of a price at fixed time scales, e.g. daily log-returns, and give an 
added sense of scale and cumulative market loss. Here we look at drawdowns calculated 
from daily prices. The concept of drawdowns has been advocated in [55} and {53} as 
an appropriate quantitative measure of large price drops. In {56} the authors have also 
advocated the concept of E-drawdowns, where the cumulative loss is recorded until a price 
rise in excess of E occurs, so that small rises in the underlying price cannot mask the 
true scale of the accumulated losses. This inevitably relies upon a subjective choice of E. 
However, the authors in [56} seem to obtain reasonable results with the choice E = u /4, for 
some estimate of the standard deviation u. The results here suggest that the E-drawdowns 
should obey a similar scaling property for reasonable choices of E. 
First we recall and expand upon the calculations in the Appendix of {55}. Using Laplace 
transforms we derive an asymptotic power law for drawdowns which is derived from a 
first-order approximation. The observed fit to drawdowns corresponding to the DJIA is 
impressive, and potential applications are briefly discussed. 
6.1.1 Drawdowns in an exponential-Levy market 
Let P*(t) denote the price of a stock at time t. We assume that P*(t) is given by the 
exponential of a Levy process. Here, we consider drawdowns calculated from time series 
of daily prices. A drawdown is a measure of the relative price drop from a local maximum 
at P*(tm) to a local minimum at P*(tmin), so that the price rises again immediately after 
time tmin· The drawdown Dtm,tmin is given by 
D _ (P*(tm)- P*(tmin)) _ l _ P*(tmin) 
tm,tmin - P*(tm) - P*(tm) • 
Let X(t) = log(P*(t)) and let dtm,tmin = X(tm)- X(tmin) be the corresponding difference 
in the log-price. By construction, we have that 
( 
P*(tm) ) 
dtm,tmin =log P*(tmin) ' 
or equivalently, that 
Dt t . = 1- e-dtm,tmin. 
m, mtn 
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Next, we consider increments x1, .. . , Xn of X(t) corresponding to regularly spaced times 
t1, .. . , tn+l so that XI = X(t2) - X(t1), ... , Xn = X(tn+d - X(tn)· In our empirical 
work we use drawdowns calculated from time series of daily returns, so that we imagine 
that the Xj correspond to daily increments or first-differences of the log-price recorded on 
consecutive days. By the assumption that P*(t) is given by the exponential of a Levy 
process, the Xj constitute an i.i.d. sample from some common distribution F. We assume 
further that F has density p(x). Starting with a local maximum X(tm), the probability 
density of dtm,tmin is given by 
fd(W) = p~ f rXJ p(x1) ... JO p(xn)8 (-W- t Xj) dx1 ... dXn, (6.1) 
P n=1 Jo -oo j=l 
where 
P+ = 1- P- =loo p(x)dx 
is the probability of observing a positive increment [55}, equation (9). The Dirac function 
8 ( -w- :Ej=1 Xj) ensures that the summation in (6.1) is over all possible run lengths of 
length n which sum tow. The equation for the density in (6.1) can be written as 
(6.2) 
where p(•n) denotes then-fold convolution of left tail of the probability density of the x3. 
Related formulae, with a focus upon random walks and ladder heights, are discussed in 
[42], Chapter 12. The~ is a normalization constant which results from the sum of a G.P. 
and ensures that the density in (6.2) is proper. 
To be precise, we note that d is constructed by sampling initially from the left tail of p(x). 
We continue to add samples from the left tail of p(x) stopping when we sample from the 
right tail. Note that since d is constructed in this way, the probability density of d is always 
proper and this is contrast to the similar-in-spirit ladder height variables, [42} Chapter 12, 
where the mean I.L of the incremental distribution of the random walk determines whether 
or not the distribution of ladder heights is proper1 . To further illustrate the construction 
of d, we show how to construct the Laplace transform of (6.2) by summing over run 
lengths r. Since we have already assumed starting at an initial local maximum X(tm), a 
run length of one occurs with probability P+• since P+ is the probability of observing a 
positive increment. This run length distribution is clearly geometric, so that p:._-IP+ gives 
1The ascending and descending ladder heights are defined as the cumulative maxima and minima of a 
random walk starting at the origin. The descending ladder height distribution is only proper for J.t~O, and 
likewise the ascending ladder height distribution is proper only for J.t~O. Additional discussion is contained 
in {42} Chapter 12. Figure 2.1 in Chapter 7 in {7/ shows pictorially how these ladder height variables are 
defined. 
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the probability of a run length of length r. Proceeding, we see that the Laplace transform 
of (6.2) is 
P(s) = ( P(s)) (P(s)) 2 (P(s))r r-l ~ P++ ~ P-P++ ... + ~ P-P++ ... , 
( P~))P+ tP(st, p r=O = 
P+ P(s) 
= p_1- P(s)' (6.3) 
by the geometric sum formula and using 
P(s) = fooo p(-x)e-sxdx. 
In order to proceed, we note that (6.3) can be re-written as 
A 1 
P( S) = 1 _ _l P(s}s-P(O) ' P+ (s) 
(6.4) 
with P(O) = P-· In the sequel we assume that the moment generating function of X(t) 
exists. This assumption is satisfied by both the generalized hyperbolic distribution /33} 
and the NIG distribution /11}, which provide two of the most tractable Levy models 
in financial applications. This assumption also guarantees that the Laplace transforms 
considered are holomorphic functions of s and can thus be expanded in Taylor series of 
powers of s. Equivalently this means that the moment generating function exists in a 
neighbourhood of the origin. 
6.1.2 A relevant model for market dynamics 
In this subsection, we show how a simple first-order approximation suggests an exponential 
approximation for the density of dtm,tmin. We show that an exact exponential left tail of 
p(x) leads to an exact exponential distribution for dtm,tm;n· An analogous result for the 
descending ladder height distribution is given in /42}. A heuristic argument suggests that 
if the left tail of p(x) is approximately exponential then the distribution of dtm,tmin should 
also be exponential. Further, it is shown that an exponential distribution for dtm,tmin leads 
to a generalised Pareto distribution for drawdowns on real markets. In the sequel, and for 
the sake of simplicity, we suppress the tm,tmin subscript. 
For small s, corresponding to d large, we can expand ~f~~ up to first order in a Taylor 
series: 
P(O) (P'(O)) 
P(s) = 1- P(O) s + o(s). (6.5) 
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Plugging the expansion in (6.5) into the equation for the Laplace transform in (6.4) leaves 
us with 
which reduces to 
with 
A 1 
P(s) ~ _ (~) ..!...' 
1 P(O} P+ 
A 1 
P(s) ~ ( ) , 
1+ ~ s P-P+ 
< x >-= -1-oo xp(-x)dx. 
(6.6) 
Finally, we note that (6.6) is the Laplace transform of an exponential density with mean 
J.L = - ;~;; . Suppressing subscripts, the implication is that 
(6.7) 
where exp().) denotes the usual exponential density on [0, oo), with ). = ~'X-.J!. (6.7) 
was originally stated in (55}, albeit subject to a minor mistake in the algebra. However, 
in (55} (6.7) was assumed to hold for the relative price drop D rather than the drop d 
in log-price. For the moment, the main point of interest is that it appears reasonable to 
consider the case where the distribution of d is approximately exponential. 
Suppose the exponential approximation (6.6) holds exactly. Equating Laplace transforms 
gives 
leading to the solution 
P+ P(s) 1 
P-1-P(s) = 1+sJ.L' 
P(s) = P- = P-
1 + P+SJ.L 1 - s<x>- ' 
P-
(6.8) 
where we have defined J.L = -P~:;.-. We can see that (6.8) corresponds to an exponential 
.left tail: 
-p2 2=-=. 
p(x) = - e<x>_, (x < 0). 
<X>- (6.9) 
We note that (6.9) is satisfied by the Laplace distribution with non-negative mean J.L and 
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variance 2b2 : 
1 l:r-pl f(x) =-e--r 
2b 0 (6010) 
Since we are considering a candidate model for financial log-returns, the condition J-L?.O is 
reasonable and corresponds to generic exponential growth behaviour 0 In the notation of 
(6o6), we have that 
(6011) 
Similarly, it follows that 
e-~ jo :r e-~ P-=- e"bdx=-, 2b _00 2 (6012) 
with P+ = 1- P- = 1- e~i o Inserting (6011-6012) into (6o9), it follows that (6o9) holds 
for x:$0 in (6010) since 
and 
(e-~) ( 2 ) 1 <X>- = -2- be-~ = bo 
A related result given in [42], page 387, is that the distribution of the first weak descending 
ladder height is proportional to ef3x, x < 0, if the incremental distribution F has an 
exponential left tail F(x) = qe11x for x < Oo If we suppose that empirical distributions for 
log-returns approximately satisfy (6o9), we suggest 
I 
1 ...!.::::_. A 1 p(x) :::::: e<:r>_ =}P(s)~--, 
x:5;0 < X >- 1 + SJ-L 
(6013) 
in the sense that if P(s)- l+ts~-' = o(s) then F(s)- 1)sl-' = o(s), since 
P+ P(s) 1 P(s)[1 + P+SJ-L]- P-
--- = P- 1- P(s) 1 + SJ-L (1- P(s))(1 + sJ-L) ' 
= 
(1 + P+SJ-L) [P(s)- l+tsp] 
(1- P(s))(1 + SJ-L) 
= a(s)b(s), (6014) 
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where a(s) = (l-(M~}(t1s~) and b(s) = [P(s)- l+~~siL]. It follows that 
l' 1 [P+ P(s) 1 ] s~-; P- 1- P(s) - 1 + SJ.L = lima(s)limb(s)ls, s--+0 s--+0 
0, 
since lims--+0 = liP+ and b(s) = o(s) by assumption. In sum, an exact exponential left 
tail (6.9) leads to an exact exponential distribution for d (6.6-6.7). We suggest that, 
for real markets, (6.6-6.7) should remain approximately true if (6.9) remains a good 
approximation. 
In the sequel, we assume that the result in (6.7) holds exactly. In this case, it follows that 
the distribution of dtm,tmin is exp(.X), where exp(.X) is the usual exponential distribution 
on [0, oo). In {55], the authors supposed that it was the difference in the raw prices rather 
than in the log-prices that satisfied (6.6). Since this corresponded to a very simple model 
for prices, the authors went beyond this theoretically derived result to consider a more 
general Weibull or stretched-exponential model for drawdowns. Johansen and Sornette 
then classified drawdowns that violated this Weibull model as 'outliers'. However, in the 
exponential-Levy market considered here, the result in (6. 7) is seen to lead naturally to a 
generalised Pareto distribution for drawdowns, suggesting a power-law tail probability for 
drawdowns on the original (non-logarithmic) scale. 
By construction, the drawdown Dtm,tmin is given by 
(6.15) 
From (6.15) the distribution of Dtm,tmin follows a generalized Pareto distribution, with 
parameters ( = -1 I). and /3 = 1 I). ( {77], Chapter 7), since if X is exp( .X) then it follows 
that the distribution function of Y = 1- e-X is given by 
Fy(x) = Pr(Y~x), 
= Pr(X~ -ln(l- x)), 
= 1-(1-x)\ (6.16) 
using Fx(x) = 1- e->.x. The log-likelihood function can readily be calculated from (6.16) 
as 
n 
l(.XJx) = nlog(.X) +(.X- 1) L log(l- xi), 
i=l 
74 
leading to the maximum likelihood estimate 
A -n ). = "'n ( . L..Ji=llog 1 - Xi) (6.17) 
As an application we looked at the sequence of drawdowns from the DJIA using daily 
data covering the period October 1st 1928 to 22nd May 2006. Results are shown in 
Figure 6.1, and show an extremely close correspondence between the empirical CDF and 
the theoretical CDF predicted by (6.16). Finally, we mention possible applications for 
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Figure 6.1: Plot of fitted GPD (.X= 66.13597) for drawdowns on the DJIA and empirical 
CDF (dots) 
options pricing, risk management and capital allocation for banks. In terms of generic 
risk management and options pricing, we may calibrate a Levy model for daily log-returns 
to historically observed sequences of drawdowns by equating the maximum likelihood 
estimate in (6.17) to the value of>. by ensuring 
1 -<X>- (6.18) -::-=----
,\ P-P+ 
where < x >- denotes the mean of the negative log-returns and P+ and P- denote the 
probabilities of observing positive and negative log-returns. Another interesting possibility 
deals with setting capital levels for banks. For some 0 < a << 1, the problem is to 
find a capital amount C so that the losses L relating to a stock market portfolio satisfy 
Pr(L >C)= a. Suppose we have holdings c/J1, ... , cPn in a portfolio of stocks X1, ... , Xn, 
for some large n. Let }i(t) = L:~1 c/JiXi(t) denote a time series of historical values of the 
portfolio. If we assume that }i(t) corresponds to an exponential-Levy market (at least 
approximately), we can use (6.18) to estimate >.. Let I denote the level of investment 
in the stock market, C the level of capital reserves and LP denote a percentage loss 
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corresponding to a drawdown sequence. For a given non-exceedance probability o:, set 
1 - o: = 1 - (1 - LP)>.. 
The capital levels C and investment levels I can then be chosen to satisfy 
C?.l.LP. 
so that with probability 1-o: the capital levels C are not exceeded by the aggregate losses. 
Risk management studies, as described for example in the guidelines of the Base! Commitee 
of Banking Supervision, have previously advocated calculating capital levels from analysis 
of daily risk levels. However, results here suggest that such an analysis should be possible 
- and may even be more natural - for runs of consecutive losses. For background on 
risk management issues and mathematical modelling we refer to [77]. Finally, methods 
in this section can easily be extended to incorporate Sornette and Johansen's concept of 
e-drawdowns by setting P+ = Pr(xj >e) and P- = Pr(xj <e). 
6.2 Sornette-Helmsetter method for complex systems 
We consider a simple model of the activity level A(t) of a system at timet, viewed as the 
noisy response to all past perturbations: 
A(t) =]_too TJ(t)K(t- r)dr, (6.19) 
where TJ(t) denotes standardized Gaussian white noise, and K(·) is referred to variously as 
the memory kernel, propagator, Green function, or response function {95]. Further, we 
assume that K(t) is a causal function ensuring that the system is not anticipative2 • One 
of the most interesting choices of K ( ·) described by Sornette and Helmsetter in {95] is 
fractional Gaussian noise which corresponds to the kernel 
1 1 
K(t- r) = (l + t- r)3/2-H = (l + t- r)l-0' (6.20) 
where H = 1/2 +()and lis a small constant whose inclusion avoids blow-up at the origin. 
In (6.20) 0 < () < 1/2 corresponds to persistence where successive variations are positively 
correlated, -1/2 < () < 0 anti persistence, where positive variations are preferentially 
followed by negative ones ( {105]). The comment is made in {95] that it is the case 
0 < 0 < 1/2 that seems to be of practical interest, and further that (6.20) appears able to 
2A function g(t) is called a causal function if is zero when t < 0. This constraint arises naturally in 
many physical systems, due to the fact that observed effects cannot precede cause and the restrictions that 
this then places on functions describing the system. 
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explain some of the phenomenology associated with Omori's power-law for earthquakes3. 
6.2.1 A simple model for exogenous shocks 
Suppose an external shock occurs at t = 0, which we model as Ao6(r), where 6(·) denotes 
Dirac's delta function. From (6.19) we see that the response of the system becomes 
A(t) = AoK(t) + [oo ry(t)K(t- r)dr, 
leading to the expected response 
E(A(t)) = AoK(t). 
In the case of a fractional Gaussian noise kernel, we obtain 
E(A(t)) = A0t8- 1, t >> l. (6.21) 
6.2.2 A simple model for endogenous shocks 
Suppose there is a large "internal" shock Ao at time 0. From the integral representation 
(6.19), we see that {A(t): tEIR.} is a Gaussian process. Thus for a given t > 0, (A(t), A(O)) 
is a bivariate normal pair. For an arbitrary bivariate normal pair X, Y we know that 
Ylx N ( 
Cav(X, Y)(X- J.Lx) 2 (Cov(X, Y))2 ) 
"' Jl.Y + 2 'l1y - 2 ' 
l1x l1x 
(6.22) 
( [46}, Chapter 4). Also, from the integral representation (6.19) we see that 
Cov(A(t), A(O)) = 1: K(t- r)K( -r)dr. (6.23) 
Using the substitution v = -T, it follows that the expected value of the system at timet 
obeys 
E(A(t)) ex Ao fooo K(t + v)K(v)dv. (6.24) 
Consider the fractional Gaussian noise kernel (6.20) and take the Laplace transform of 
(6.24), where the Laplace transform is defined as 
L(f(t)) = fooo f(t)e-stdt. 
3 n(t) = (c.~t)P, where n denotes the number of aftershocks, K is the magnitude of the initial quake, c 
is a time offset and pE(0.7, 1.5). 
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We note that the RHS of (6.24) is the convolution of K(t) with itself. We note that we 
have we have L(t8- 1 = r(9)s-8 , [61}, Chapter 5, where r(·) denotes the gamma function 
given by 
Since K(t)rvt8- 1 , t >> l, it follows that L(K(s))""Const.s-8 . Hence, the Laplace 
transform of (6.24) is of the form Const.s-28 , suggesting 
t >> l. (6.26) 
The predictions (6.21) and (6.26) are intended to represent generic behaviour of complex 
systems, with "endogenous" shocks exhibiting a significantly slower power law decay than 
"exogenous" shocks, for 9>0. 
6.3 The multifractal random walk (MRW) model 
The aim here is to demonstrate how and under what circumstances approximate power-
law decay of volatility is predicted by {100}. The discussion in this section is intended only 
as a very brief guide. For further details see for example [79} and [Bj. The multifractal 
random walk model is the continuous time limit of a stochastic volatility model with the 
log-volatility possessing logarithmically decaying correlations. In the version of this model 
considered by [100}, for each time scale Llts;t, the returns at scale Llt, r~t(t), can be 
described as a stochastic volatility model 
T~t(t) = t(t)·O'~t(t) = t(t)eW~t(t), (6.27) 
where t(t) is a standardized Gaussian white noise independent of W~t, and W~t is a 
Gaussian process with mean and covariance: 
J.l~t = 1/2ln(a2L:l.t)- C~t(O), 
C~t := Cov(W~t(t), W~t(t + r)) = .\2 ln err+ z)' (6.28) 
where u 2 Llt is the return variance at scale L:l.t, l is a small constant to avoid blow-up at the 
origin and T represents the time scale over which volatility is correlated. [22}, Chapter 7 
Section 3, state that the MRW model is attractive as it suggests both log-normal volatility 
fluctuations and logarithmic decay in the correlation function of the log-volatility, both of 
which can be verified empirically. According to [100} the MRW model can be written in 
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a more accessible form in which the log-volatility W~t(t) obeys an autoregressive equation 
W~t(t) =/_too ?J(r)K~t(t- r)dr, (6.29) 
where 17(t) denotes a standardized Gaussian white noise and the memory kernel K~t(·) 
is a causal function ensuring that the system is not anticipative. The process 17(t) can 
be interpreted as the information flow, with w(t) representing the response of the market 
to the incoming information up to time t. Rather than multifractality, it is the kernel 
representation shown in (6.29), see also (6.19), which is the key mathematical feature 
of interest here. At time t the distribution of W~t(t) is Gaussian with mean 1-L~t and 
variance V~t = j 000 K!t(r)dr = >.2log(f), consistent with (6.28). The covariance- which 
in conjunction with the mean completely specifies the random process - is given by 
(6.30) 
Performing a Fourier analysis we obtain 
6~tU) = 2 fooo fooo K~t(r)Kt:J.t(r + t)e-ift drdt, 
= 2 fooo fooo K~t(r)Kt:J.t(v)e-ifveifT dvdr, 
= 2 I i<~tU) 12 , (6.31) 
where f< denotes the Fourier transform of K. Using (6.28), we thus see that 
C~t(f) = 2>.2 loT ln ( t ~ l) cos(ft) dt, 
~ 2;' [ H t ~I) sin(/{+ { si;~:) •+ (6.32) 
where the second line. follows from integration by parts. The first term in (6.32) is 
approximately zero - it corresponds to a logarithmically decaying covariance function 
which tends to zero as it approaches T- and is equal to 
ln ( 1 - T ~ l) sin(JT). (6.33) 
Turning to the second term and using the change of variable v = tf, we can see that 
[T sin(ft) dt = [Tf sin(v) dv. 
} 0 t + l lo v + fl (6.34) 
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Further, we have that 
[Tf (sin(v) _ sin(v)) dv <fl [Tf sin(v) dv . 
Jo v v + fl - Jo v(v + fl) 
From (6.35) we also have 
1Tf sin(v) ---'--'--dv o v(v+fl) < [Tf I sin(v) Id Jo v(v + fl) v, 
< {Tf 1 
lo v + fl' 
= ln(T/l + 1). 
= O(ln(1/ fl)), 
(6.35) 
(6.36) 
under the assumption that 1/ fl > T + fl. (6.36) follows from the fact that sin;x) :::;1 for 
all x. From the above (6.32) reduces to 
• 2>.2 [ {Tf sin(v) ] CI::.t(/)=f Jo -v-dv+O(flln(1/fl)) . (6.37) 
For large Tf, the integral in ( 6.37) approximates J000 sin;x)dx = ~. and then (6.37) is 
approximately given by 
(6.38) 
Assuming that (6.38) holds with equality, we have that 
(6.39) 
By (6.28) and (6.30) we see that KI::.t(·) must be a decreasing function oft, and it then 
follows from (6.39) that 
T >> l, (6.40) 
for Ko =~since 
and 1 £- 1/ 2 I= ..fiif-112 • According to [100], this slow power law decay of the memory 
memory kernel in (6.40) ensures the long-range dependence and multifractality of the 
MRW. 
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6.3.1 Linear response to an external shock 
The transfer function formalism introduced in (6.29) gives us an interesting insight here. 
Assume that a new piece of information T/(t) = wo<S(t) impacts on the market (taken 
without loss of generality to bet = 0 since the system is stationary). Using the transfer 
function formalism, the response to the shock is 
w(t) = J.L +/_too (wob(T) + 'f/(T))K(t- T)dT 
= J.L + woK(t) + [
00 
'f/(T))K(t- T)dT, 
where for convenience the reference to the scale !:::.t has been omitted. Given the causal 
representation of the MRW, the expected volatility conditional on this new incoming 
information is given by 
E[<72(t)lw(t)] = e2t~+2woK(t) E[e2f~oo !J(T)K(t-T)dT] 
= 0"2(t)e24.1oK(t) 
<72(t)e2woKoJT, 
for !:::.t << t << T, where <72(t) = e2t~E[e2f~oo'1(T)K(t-T)dT] is the unconditional average 
of the stochastic process 0"2(t). Following the shock, the volatility relaxes back down to 
its unconditional average <72(t). This means that under a linear approximation we are left 
with behaviour of the form 
(6.41) 
with a = 0.5. The prediction made by (6.41) can then be used as the focus of empirical 
work. 
6.3.2 "Conditional response" to an endogeneous shock 
We consider the evolution of the system, which despite the absence of a large external 
shock nonetheless exhibits a large volatility burst wo at time 0. Now w(t) is a Gaussian 
process, and using the fact that the moment generating function of a N(J.L, <72) is et~t+172 t2 12 
and that 2w(t)"'N(2J.L(t),4<72(t)) we see that 
E[<72(t)lwo] = E[e24.1(t)lwo] 
= exp(2E[w(t)lwo] + 2Var[w(t)iwo]). 
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Further, since w(t) is a Gaussian process we can use the relation (6.22) to see that 
E[w(t)iwo] 
and also 
Cov[w(t), woJ2 Var[w(t)iwo] = Var[w(t)]- V [ ] 
ar wo 
Set e2wo = e28112 (t). Hence s provides a measure of the "size" of w0 , with 112(t) = e20(0)+2~-L 
equal to the ("unconditional") expectation E(112(t)) = e2C(0)+2~-'. Equating exponentials, 
we can see that we have wo- J.L = s + C(O). By substituting into the above formula we 
can see that we obtain 
where 
---2--- [ C(t) C2(t)] E[112 (t)lwo] = 11 (t) exp 2(wo - J.L)· C(O) - 2 C(O) 
---2--- [ . C(t) C2 (t)] 
= 11 (t) exp 2(s + C(O))· C(O) - 2 C(O) 
__ ( T ) o(s)+i3(t) 
= 112 (t) -
t + l ' 
o(s) 
f3(t) 
2s 
= 
In (f)' 
= 2A2 ln(t/l + 1) ln(T /l) ' 
(6.42) 
using the form for C(t) in (6.28) and in agreement with the result stated in [100]. If 
l << t << leW we have that f3(t) << o(s) and (6.42) can be seen to lead to an 
approximate power-law decay in the volatility: 
Thus, even in the case of an endogenous crisis we may expect to find approximate power-
law decay of the volatility provided the condition l < < t < < le W holds. Thus, we may 
test the model of [100} by testing for a power-law C 0 decay in the historical volatility 
with o = 0.5. Values less than 0.5 suggest a slower decay and an endogenous aspect, by 
analogy with the fractional Gaussian noise model in Section 2. 
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6.4 Data analysis 
Given the stochastic representation (6.27), we use the squared log-returns as the 
appropriate volatility proxy for u2 . As a candidate model, we consider 
(6.43) 
For the results to be consistent with the model of {100}, we should have B > 0 and 
a= -1/2 in (6.43), at least for exogenous shocks. In order to estimate the model (6.43) we 
employ the pragmatic estimation technique commonly employed in the physics literature 
(see for instance /100}, {54]) by "integrating" (6.43) and fitting the model 
Btl+o: 
Vn(t) = At+ -1-- + ft, +a (6.44) 
where Vn(t) = L:~=l u~. This is a commonly used technique to estimate power law 
exponents in models of the form (6.43). This method is intended to ensure that the 
estimates obtained are more robust with respect to the presence of background noise, 
model mis-specification etc. We estimate (6.44) by least squares, using 100 values of 
daily log-returns. The resulting regressions typically return R2 values of around 90%. We 
compare and contrast market responses to the 1987 crash with responses to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th 2001, the attempted coup against President Gorbachev on 
August 19th 1991, Black Monday October 19th 1987 and the Nasdaq crash taken to be 
April lOth 2000. We describe the results obtained in the next subsection. 
6.4.1 Empirical results 
When examining markets in the aftermath of the attempted coup against President 
Gorbachev, one of the surprising features that we find is that much of the volatility occurs 
towards the end of the sample period. As a result, the model (6.43) seems inappropriate 
for this data and the estimated a values obtained are positive, reflecting the enhanced 
volatility towards the end of the sample (see Table 6.1). 
Market a 
Nasdaq 1.973 (0.600) 
CAC 40 6.682 (0.020) 
FTSE 6.349 (0.037) 
Nikkei 7.936 (0.014) 
S&P 500 3.697 (30.040) 
Table 6.1: Results based on 100 trading days after August 19th 1991 
In contrast, there are a number of markets in which the model (6.43) appears more 
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reasonable. In particular, we obtain estimates of a~ - 0.5, suggestive of an exogenous 
root under the MRW model of (100}, see Table 6.2. Note, however, that the estimated 
exponents are seen to vary significantly from -0.5, and the model of (100} systematically 
fails to correctly estimate the empirically observed power-law exponent of the volatility 
decay. A better estimate would appear to be a:::::0.7±0.15, although non-overlapping 
confidence intervals do suggest some differences between the various markets. 
Market a 95% C. I 
Nasdaq Oct. 19th 1987 -0.691 (0.016) ( -0. 72, -0.66) 
FTSE Oct. 19th 1987 -0.742 (0.006) (-0.75, -0.73) 
Nikkei Oct. 19th 1987 -0.852 (0.009) (-0.87, -0.84) 
Nikkei Sept. 11th 2001 -0.718 (0.031) (-0.78, -0.66) 
S&P 500 Oct. 19th 1987 -0.624 (0.033) (-0.69, -0.56) 
DJIA Oct. 24th 1929 -0.535 (0.021) ( -0.58, -0.49) 
Table 6.2: Selected results (a < -0.5) 
Finally, on some markets we find some suggestion of an exogenous crises, with observed 
volatilities decaying slower than the value -0.5 predicted by the model of (100}. The 
results are interesting in that proposed bubbles such as the Nasdaq 2000 and the Hang 
Seng in 1994 are seen to lead to a depressed volatility decay in line with the interpretation 
of crashes as endogenous events. However, the model of {100} is unable to predict the 
exponent of the power law corresponding to an endogenous cause. In addition, we have the 
suggestion of slow logarithmic volatility decay on the FTSE and the CAC 40 on April lOth 
2000 in response to the crash in internet stocks. The events of September 11th are also 
seen to lead to a volatility decay that this simple approach would more readily associate 
with an exogenous cause. The results are shown in Table 6.3. 
Market a 95% C. I 
Nasdaq April 10th 2000 -0.177 (0.007) ( -0.19, -0.16) 
Nasdaq Sept. 11th 2001 -0.071 (0.015) (-0.10, -0.04) 
CAC 40 April lOth 2000 -0.01 (0.000) (-0.01, -0.01) 
FTSE April lOth 2000 -0.01 (0.000) (-0.01, -0.01) 
FTSE Sept. 11th 2001 -0.220 (0.022) (-0.26, -0.17) 
Nikkei April lOth 2000 -0.274 (0.054) (-0.38, -0.17) 
S&P 500 April lOth 2000 -0.298 (0.034) (-0.36, -0.23) 
S&P 500 Sept. 11th 2001 -0.391 (0.048) ( -0.49, -0.3) 
Hang Seng Jan. 6th 1994 -0.174 (0.101) (-0.38, 0.03) 
Table 6.3: Selected results (a > -0.5) 
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6.5 Synthesis 
In this section we detail briefly how the model of {100] can be modified to obtain a better 
fit with the empirical results. The comment is made in {95] that the multifractal random 
walk model corresponds, at least approximately, to the fractional Gaussian noise kernel 
(6.20) with () = 1/2. Suppose that we retain the integral equation for the log-volatility 
(6.29), but that K(t) takes the form (6.20) for() =F 1/2 in general. By the same reasoning, 
the formula for the linear response to an external shock (6.41) follows through, with the 
cl/2 replaced by a more general t 1- 8 dependence. The estimated values obtained in 
Table 6.2 would then be consistent with the choice()= 0.3 ± 0.15. Similar considerations 
also enable one to predict the exponents of the power-law decay in volatility that should 
accompany an endogenous shock. 
Suppose F(t) = At8- 1 , for() > 0, A constant. We have the integral formulae 
fooo cos(Jt)F(t)dt 
fooo sin(Jt)F(t)dt 
A f(()) (()1r) = ycos 2 , 
A f(()) . (()1r) = ysm 2 , 
(6.45) 
( {61], Chapter 10), where f(·) denotes the gamma function given by (6.25). Thus, we 
have 
Hence, since K(t)rvt8- 1 , t >> l, and using (6.31), it follows that 
and hence, from (6.45), that 
t >> l, (6.46) 
for () < 1/2. Inserting (6.46) into (6.42) then gives 
---2--- [ C7(t) (72(t)] 
u (t) exp 2(s + C7(0))· C7(0) - 2 C(O) . 
After a sufficiently long time, the volatility relaxes down to its unconditional average u2(t). 
Since 
- [ C7(t) C72 (t)] -u2(t) exp 2(s + C7(0))·-- 2-- - u2(t) C7(0) C(O) Const.t
26
-
1
, 
this predicts an approximate t28- 1 power-law decay associated with an endogenous crisis. 
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8 E (0.3, 0.45) predicts a C 0 volatility decay with exponent a in the range (0.1, 0.4), in 
reasonable agreement with most of the values in Table 6.3. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have explored the possible applications of power laws to a mathematical 
theory of financial crashes. In the first section we derived results building on original work 
in [55}. In particular, we derived a generalized Pareto distribution for drawdowns on an 
exponential-Levy market. This approximate result was seen to fit well to an historical 
series of drawdowns corresponding to the DJIA. Potential applications include calibration 
of Levy process models to financial data and capital allocation problems in banks. 
In Sections 2-4 we examined the method of [ 1 00} for determining endogenous or exogenous 
causes of crises. We found at least some evidence to support the analogy between stock 
market crashes and simple models for endogenous and exogenous perturbations of complex 
systems. However, stock markets are complicated and we have two notable observations. 
Following the attempted coup against President Gorbachev in August 1991, much of the 
observed volatility is seen to occur towards the end of the sample period and not in the 
immediate aftermath. In addition, the volatility decay corresponding to September 11th 
appears more like that associated with "endogenous" events such as the crash of internet 
stocks in April 2000, and the bubble on the Hang Seng. 
However, we do seem to have at least some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
endogenous crises lead to a slower volatility decay than exogenous crises. However, 
the model of [100} systematically fails to recreate the empirically observed exponents 
corresponding to exogenous shocks, and is unable to predict the exponent corresponding 
to an endogenous shock. A better match with empirical data is found when the log-
volatility is assumed to obey a fractional Gaussian noise process. Under this model, we 
are also able to extend the original formulation and predict the exponent of the power law 
of the volatility associated with endogenous crises, to a reasonable degree of agreement 
with the empirical data in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. 
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Chapter 7 
Evaluating contagion in economics 
According to {6} the economic literature on currency and banking crises can be usefully 
divided into insurance crisis and illiquidity crisis models. Chapters 1-5, see also Appendix 
Con market-value models, essentially constitute insurance crisis models and deal with how 
the inherent risks are priced by markets. With illiquidity crisis models the main feature of 
interest is the transfer of shocks between different countries and sectors. It is this second 
theme which motivates material in this chapter. In particular, how we might seek to 
define and measure contagion in a manner that can give practical answers to important 
real questions? The layout of this chapter is as follows. In Section 1 we motivate our 
discussion with a brief survey of the relevant economic literature. In Section 2 we describe 
the relevant mathematical and statistical background. In Section 3 we give a statistical 
solution to the problem of evaluating contagion in economics, with an application to the 
Latin American currency crisis of the 1990s. Section 4 summarises. 
7.1 Contagion 
According to [57} contagion has been defined in various different ways in the literature. 
To some degree of generality the term contagion relates to the transfer of economic shocks 
across countries or sectors, although this definition is not complete in itself. {58} defines 
contagion as the situation where the knowledge of crisis in one country increases the risk of 
crisis in another country. Alternatively, some authors restrict the definition of contagion 
to situations where the magnitude of a shock exceeds that which might be expected purely 
on the basis of economic fundamentals. 
According to Jokipii and Lacey, much of the theoretical work on contagion and propagation 
of crises can be categorized into three main areas: aggregate shocks which affect the 
economic fundamentals of more than country; country-specific shocks which affect the 
economic fundamentals of other countries; and shocks which are not explained by economic 
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fundamentals and are classified as pure contagion. Interesting empirical issues are then 
connected to testing for the existence of contagion and also quantifying how shocks are 
transmitted through the financial system. 
Among the most widely used procedures used to test for contagion are simple OLS 
regressions [3}, principal component analysis {59}, and analysis of correlation coefficients 
{36}. Tests based on correlation assume that any changes in coefficient estimates obtained 
reflect material changes. However, it is important to recognise a possible bias brought 
about by the estimates obtained being conditional on extreme market movements over 
the period in question. [43} recognises a distinction between genuine contagion and 
interdependence. Markets may just be interdependent and may naturally respond 
similarly to a common shock. Contagion in this context then reflects genuine changes 
in the relationship between two different markets over and above naturally occurring 
interdependence. According to Jokipii and Lacey, much work in the literature fails to 
make an adequate distinction between the two. 
A second question associated with the issue of contagion is evaluating the different channels 
through which shocks can be propagated across countries. According to Jokipii and Lacey, 
much work has focussed on a small array of simple techniques. These include regression 
-both OLS and logit/probit models- and principal components analysis. A few studies 
have also tried to use news as the identifying condition for the propagation of shocks [37}. 
Eichengreen et al. study the collapse of fixed exchange rates in the ERM in 1993, with 
one county's collapse taken to be the external news event. 
7. 2 Statistical background 
This section is concerned with the question of contagion in economics and statistical 
methods which can be used to provide insight. In particular the focus here is on methods 
proposed in Chapter 6 of (71}, with some of the background discussion taken from 
[77}, Chapter 5. In terms of the economic applications, the salient point is as follows. 
Contagion relates to the transfer of economic shocks across countries or sectors. However, 
the major complication is the need to distinguish between genuine contagion and simple 
interdependence. The following two sections describe how we may proceed to answer this 
question statistically. This is primarily an empirical question and one should not read too 
much into the fact that the theoretical model we use is the simple random walk model. 
However, even with this choice of very simple model, there are some theoretical aspects 
which we need to clarify. The next three subsections provide a brief description of the 
relevant mathematical and statistical background. 
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7 .2.1 Copulae 
The subject of copulae is one of the important underlying themes here. Intuitively, the 
copula plays the key role in multivariate distribution theory by literally 'coupling' (linking) 
the various univariate marginal densities with one unique multivariate density. Consider 
two continuous random variables X and Y with joint distribution function H so that 
H(x,y) = Pr[X:::;x;Y:::;yj. 
Let F and G denote the marginal distributions of X and Y respectively. Then, a bivariate 
copula would be a function C satisfying 
H(x, y) = C(F(x), G(y)), (7.1) 
so that the copula couples the univariate marginals to a multivariate distribution. If the 
marginals are continuous then this representation is unique (See Sklar's theorem overleaf). 
Thus the copula fully describes the probabilistic eo-dependence of X and Y, and there 
is a sense whereby one can talk of a "copula property" of X and Y as a true feature of 
the probabilistic eo-dependence of X and Y. Several concordance or correlation measures, 
such as Spearman's rho, can be constructed as direct functionals of the underlying copula. 
One is thus not restricted to the simple linear correlation coefficient, which depends on 
both the underlying copula and the univariate marginals, as a sometimes flawed measure 
of eo-dependence. Several examples exist whereby variables which are completely eo-
dependent nonetheless have a linear correlation of zero. In addition, there are interesting 
theoretical considerations, such as the Invariance Theorem, which motivate the use of 
copulae in the study of eo-dependent random variables. 
We consider the situation with n > 2 random variables. Let G be a continuous univariate 
distribution function. It is shown in [77], Chapter 5 Section 1 that 
G(Y)"'U(O, 1). (7.2) 
(7.2) is known as the probability transform. We follow the presentation in [71}, Chapter 
3. First we need the following useful definition. A function C : [0, 1] 2-R is described as 
being 2-increasing if 
(7.3) 
for any u1:::;u2, v1:::;v2. One can go a step further if we take (7.3) to be the appropriate 
notion of a "C-volume" in [0, If This notion of a volume measure in two-dimensions 
can then be extended ton-dimensions. For a function C : [0, 1]n-R this measure can be 
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defined as 
(7.4) 
where Ujl and Uj2 denote the end-points of the lh box in [0, 1]n. Using (7.4) one also 
has a notion of n-positivity if this sum is positive. These considerations allow us to give 
a mathematical definition of copulae inn-dimensions. We also have Sklar's theorem (see 
theorem 8.2.3 below), which describes copulae as a multivariate generalisation of (7.2). 
Finally we also give the result of an invariance theorem. This Invariance Theorem is a 
very powerful result, demonstrating that the copula is an intrinsic measure of dependence 
as it is invariant under increasing nonlinear transformations. 
Definition 7.2.1 A function C: [0, 1]n-+[O, 1] is an-copula if (i)-(iii) hold: 
(i) For all uE[O, 1], C(1, ... , 1, u, 1...1) = u. 
(ii) C(ub .. , un) = 0 if at least one of the Ui equals zero. 
(iii) C is n-increasing which means that the sum in (7.4) is positive. 
Here, with econometric applications in mind, it is natural to restrict attention to the case 
of a random vector X with continuous marginals. In this case we can say quite a lot more: 
Definition 7.2.2 (Continuous case) If the random vector X has joint distribution 
function F with continuous marginal distributions F1, ... Fn, then the copula ofF is the 
distribution function C of (F1 (XI), ... , Fn(Xn)). 
In this continuous case, it becomes clear that the copula is simply a multivariate 
distribution function with U(O, 1) marginals. Moreover, this representation is unique: 
Theorem 7.2.3 (Sklar's Theorem) Given a n-dimensional distribution function F 
with continuous marginal distributions F11 ... , Fn, there exists a unique n-copula C : 
[0, 1r-[o, 1] such that 
For a proof of Sklar's theorem as stated above, see (77], Chapter 5. A more general result 
is given in (82], page 18. Here, we define a scalar function h to be strictly increasing if 
x 1 > x2=>h(xl) > h(x2). We have the following: 
Theorem 7.2.4 (Invariance Theorem) Let X11 ... , Xn be continuous random variables 
with copula C. Then, if h1(Xl), ... hn(Xn) are strictly increasing on the ranges of X1, ... Xn, 
then the random variables Y1 = h1(X1), ... , Yn = hn(Xn) have exactly the same copula, C. 
For a proof see (77}, Chapter 5 Section 1. As an illustration we can use the invariance 
theorem to provide an expression for the Gaussian copula - the copula for a multivariate 
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normal distribution. Suppose X "'Nn(J..L, "2:.). Since the operation of standardising by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation amounts to applying a series 
of strictly increasing transformations1, we can see by applying the Invariance theorem 
inductively that X must have the same copula as Nn(O, P), where P is the correlation 
matrix of X. From the definition of copulae in the continuous case, we can read off 
Cp,x(ui, ... , Un) = Pr(~(XI):5ul, ... ~(Xn):5Un), 
= ~p(~- 1 (u1), ... ~- 1 (un)), 
where ~P denotes the distribution function of a Nn(O,P) variate. 
7.2.2 Dependence measures 
The prototypical measure of dependence is linear correlation, defined by 
(X X ) _ Cov(X1, X2) 
P 11 2 - JVar(X)Var(Y) (7.5) 
The linear correlation does satisfy p(X1, X2) = 0 when X1 and X2 are independent, but 
the converse does not hold in general. Moreover, the linear correlation is invariant under 
linear transformations in that 
(7.6) 
Trivially (7.6) holds in the case of strictly increasing linear transformations with (31 and 
(32 positive. However, correlation is not invariant under nonlinear strictly increasing 
transformations, so that in general we have 
(7.7) 
for a strictly increasing nonlinear function T. In contrast, we see from the Invariance 
Theorem that (T(X1), T(X2)) share the same copula as (X1, X2). Hence, if p can be 
expressed as a functional of the underlying copula of (X1, X2), we would have equality in 
(7.7). Moreover, we can construct simple examples where two random variables X and Y 
are completely eo-dependent but have zero linear correlation 0. [Suppose w is U[O, 27r] and 
consider (X, Y) = (sin(w),cos(w)).] Finally, linear correlation is only defined for variables 
with a finite variance. According to {71 }, Chapter 4 Section 3, there are also cases when 
the correlation coefficient is defined but the usual sample estimator has as its asymptotic 
distribution a fat-tailed Levy stable distribution. Thus sample estimates obtained may 
deviate quite considerably from their true underlying values. 
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As a remedy to the various deficiencies of linear correlation, [77] mention rank correlations. 
These provide simple scalar measures of dependence which depend solely on the copula 
of a bivariate distribution - in contrast to the linear correlation coefficient which depends 
on both. There are two practical reasons for looking at rank correlations. Theoretically, 
these statistics are attractive as they can be calculated as direct functionals of the copula. 
In practical terms, they enable calibration of copulae to empirical data, and since they 
are calculated by looking solely at the ranks of data- rather than the actual data values 
- they are also more robust with respect to outliers and extreme values. One example of 
the rank correlation statistics discussed by McNeil et al. is Spearman's rho. Spearman's 
rho is given by the linear correlation of the probability-transformed random variables: 
Definition 7.2.5 (Spearman's rho) For random variables X1 and X2 with marginal 
distribution functions FI and F2. Spearman's rho is given by ps(XI, X2) = 
p(H(XI), F2(X2)). 
For n > 2, we may speak of a Spearman's rho matrix S for the random vector X, where 
Sij = p8 (Xi, Xj)· The following lemma motivates our discussion, and enables us to show 
that Spearman's rho can be constructed as a functional of the underlying copula only. 
Lemma 7.2.6 (Hoffding formula) If (XI,X2) has joint distribution function F and 
marginal distribution functions FI and F2, then the covariance of XI and X2 when finite 
is given by 
A proof can be found in [77], Chapter 5 Section 2. We have the following. 
Proposition 7.2. 7 Suppose XI and X2 have continuous marginal distributions and 
unique copula C. Then Spearman's rho is given by 
ps(XI,X2) = 121I1I (C(u1.u2)- UIU2) duidu2, 
= 121I 1I C(ui,u2) duidu2- 3. (7.9) 
Proof. The factor of 12 appears because Ui = Fi(Xi) is U(O, 1) with variance 1/12. The 
full formula follows by straightforward application of Hoffding's formula (7.8). (7.9) shows 
that Spearman's rho can be constructed as a functional which depends directly on the 
underlying copula. 
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7 .2.3 Conditional dependence measures 
We now motivate a statistical treatment of contagion more directly, by introducing the 
concepts of conditional dependence measures and conditional correlation. {71], Chapter 
6, introduces the concept of conditional correlation. Let X, and Y denote two real random 
variables. If A is a subset of .IR, the conditional correlation coefficient PA is defined by 
Cov(X, YIYEA) 
P A = -.Jr.:=V::=a=r (:;:::X;:;:I Y:;:::::E A=::)#V::=a=r (;:::Y::;=;I Y:::::;E=A=.=) (7.10) 
There are two versions of (7.10) which are of key interest to us here. These are the two cases 
where returns are conditioned upon exceedance of given positive and negative thresholds. 
We define p1; to correspond with the case that the conditioning set A is [v, +oo), and p;; 
when the conditioning set A is (-oo, v]. Though the conditional correlation is a slightly 
more sophisticated notion of linear dependence than the usual linear correlation coefficient, 
it remains a purely linear notion of dependence. In particular, there remains a two-fold 
dependence both on the marginal distributions and the joint distributions. To counter 
this, Malevergne and Sornette (Chapter 6, Section 4) introduce the notion of a conditional 
Spearman's rho statistic, which is intended to better reflect properties of the underlying 
copula and may be a more robust method to consider in practice. 
Recall that if U = Fx(X) and V = Fy(Y) then Spearman's rho was simply the linear 
correlation between U and V. It is this insight which is used to motivate the notion of a 
conditional Spearman's rho statistic. There are two conditional Spearman statistics that 
are of interest here: 
p;(v) = 
Cov(U, VIV2:=v) 
y'Var(UIV2:=v)Var(VIV2:=v)' 
Cov(U, VIV~v) 
y'Var(UIV~v)Var(VIV~v) · 
As shown in Malevergne and Sornette Chapter 6, it is possible to obtain analytical 
expressions for the conditional correlation coefficient in the case of the bivariate Normal 
and bivariate t-distributions. However, the conditional Spearman's rho statistic is much 
harder to deal with theoretically and usually has to be calculated numerically. 
7.3 A statistical approach to evaluating contagion in 
economics 
The methodology introduced in {71 j directly uses the conditional correlation coefficient 
and conditional Spearman's rho to evaluate contagion in economics. One can conclude 
in favour of a contagion from X to Y if the empirical conditional correlation measure of 
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YIX exceeds the confidence interval obtained under a suitable null hypothesis. We assume 
that the log-price follows a symmetric random walk. Thus we restrict attention under the 
null hypothesis to a constant correlation structure. This may be criticised as unrealistic, 
but the empirical convenience of the method is attractive. As an empirical question we 
may reasonably seek to define contagion as that observed over and above what we would 
expect if we were sampling from a simple symmetric random walk. {71] consider both 
bivariate normal and bivariate Student-t models, concluding in favour of the Student-t 
distribution as this copula allows for asymptotic dependence and is not restricted to the 
case of asymptotic independence as is the Gauss copula ( [77], Chapter 5, Section 3). 
Implicit here, is financial modelling using heavy-tailed non-Gaussian elliptically-contoured 
distributions {18]. Elliptically contoured distributions form a natural generalisation of 
the family of multivariate normal distributions, sharing many of the familiar properties 
of the normal distribution such as stability under conditional expectations and linear 
transformations. Where Malevergne and Sornette consider the bivariate t distribution, 
we consider the symmetric generalised hyperbolic distribution. Let XLr and YLr denote 
log-returns corresponding to X and Y respectively. As a solution to the economic question 
of evaluating contagion from X and Y, our proposed method follows the heuristic: 
1. Look at daily log-returns, and assume a simple symmetric random walk. 
2. For each XLr = XLr calculate the conditional distribution of YLriXLr· 
3. For each XLr = XLr simulate YLr from YLriXLr, and calculate the conditional correlation 
measure for this pseudosample. Repeat this process. 
4. There is evidence in favour of contagion if the sample conditional correlation measures 
lie outside the Monte Carlo confidence regions constructed in this way. 
Note that as presented here the method does not require numerical integration to calculate 
the exact conditional concordance measures for the assumed null distribution. The main 
point of interest is whether or not the observed sample values lie outside the Monte Carlo 
confidence intervals generated using steps 1-4. 
7.3.1 The generalized hyperbolic distribution 
Both the generalized hyperbolic distribution and Student's t distribution are regularly 
used in finance as more realistic and heavier tailed alternatives to the normal distribution. 
A comparison of the two is made in [77], Chapter 3 Section 2. The generalized hyperbolic 
distribution was introduced in {10] and popularised as a financial model by {34] and 
{35]. The theoretical background helps to provide context. So-called normal variance-
mean mixtures [18] are among the simplest ways of generating multivariate distributions 
with both heavy tails and asymmetry. If U is a random variable with law F on [0, oo) and 
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X is an d x 1 random vector, then X is a normal variance-mean mixture if 
(7.11) 
where .6 is a symmetric positive definite ('covariance') dxd matrix satisfying a determinant 
one identifiability constraint, J.L and {3 are d vectors. J.L is called the position and {3 is called 
the drift and models asymmetry. Now financial time series- such as log-returns calculated 
over intervals of one day or longer - tend to be only very slightly asymmetric. Thus it is 
common practice to model financial time series using distributions which retain symmetry 
but have heavy non-Gaussian tails. This can be achieved by considering nonnal variance 
mixtures, corresponding to the case where the drift parameter {3 in (7.11) is zero. Both the 
generalized hyperbolic and Student t distributions can be considered as normal variance-
mean mixture models. In this case, the generalized hyperbolic distribution corresponds to 
the case where U in (7.11) is generalized inverse Gaussian (GIG(>.., x, t/I)).The Student tv 
distribution is the case where U is inverse gamma (IG(v/2, v/2)). 
There are further theoretical reasons for considering the generalized hyperbolic distribution 
and the Student t distribution as suitable candidate models in finance. Firstly, if we restrict 
attention to the symmetric normal variance mixture case, then both of these distributions 
belong to the class of elliptically contoured distributions. This family constitutes a natural 
semi-parametric generalisation of the multivariate normal family. In the regular case where 
the density exists and the covariance matrix :E is of full rank, the density of a elliptically 
contoured random variable can be written as 
( {19}, equation (EC)). The multivariate normal distribution is the special case g(x) = 
(27r)-d/2e-x12 . Further, in a dynamic setting, the generalized hyperbolic and Student t 
distributions are also of interest in building heavy-tailed Levy process generalisations of 
the geometric Brownian motion model of the stock market. Note that both the generalized 
hyperbolic and Student t distributions are infinitely divisible. So that if for example we 
were looking at daily prices, there would be a Levy process whose daily increments were 
generalized hyperbolic (with the same parameters) and also a Levy process whose daily 
increments were Student t. 
In the general asymmetric normal variance-mean mixture case, the density of the 
generalized hyperbolic distribution is given by 
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where a:2 = '1/J + f3'l:l. -l /3. If X has a generalized hyperbolic distribution, we use the short-
hand ghd(>.., a, /3, x, J.L, tl.), where d denotes the dimension of the random vector X. We 
restrict attention here to the symmetric normal variance mixture case. In this case the 
density of a generalized hyperbolic random variable simplifies considerably, and is given 
by 
x->./2'1/Jd/2->./2 K>.-d/2 ( J(x + (x- J.t)'l:l. t (x- J.t) )'1/J) 
f(x) = (27r)df2K>.(v'Xifi) (x+(x-J.t)'tl.-1(x-J.t)'I/J)d/4->.f2 ' (7.12) 
where K>. is a modified Bessel function of the third kind satisfying the integral 
representation 
1 100 >.-1 { 1 ( 1 ) } K>.(x) = 2 -oo u exp 2 u +:;;: du (x > 0). 
We employ the pragmatic estimation method used by {14]- which is applicable for the 
symmetric elliptically contoured case considered here. We estimate J.t by the empirical 
mean vector and l:l. by the empirical variance scaled to have determinant one. Then we 
base estimation of the other parameters upon maximization of the likelihood suggested by 
the formula given in (7.12). We perform the optimisation using the Nelder-Mead method 
( {81]). 
There are further reasons why the generalized hyperbolic distribution might be of interest 
for use in financial modelling. Namely tractability, as this class of distributions remains 
closed under linear transformations and forming conditional distributions. The full results 
are given in {20]. Quoting the result for conditional distributions we have 
Theorem 7.3.1 Suppose that X is a d-dimensional variate distributed according to the 
generalized hyperbolic distribution ghd(>..,a,/3,x,J.L,tl.). Let (Xt,X2) be a partitioning of 
X, and let r and k denote the dimensions of X1 and X2 respectively. Let (/31,;32) and 
(J.L1, J.L2 ) be the corresponding partitions of /3 and J.t. Let 
be a partition of tl. such that l:l.n is a rxr matrix. Then the conditional distribution of 
x2 given x1 =X} is ghk(J.., a., (3, x., p,, 3.) where 
>.. = ).. - r/2, 
1 
a. = a:ll:l.ul2k, 
(3 = /32, 
X. = 
-1 1 
ltl.niT(x + (x1- J.Lt)'tl.ii (x1- J.L1)), 
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Here we are simply interested in the symmetric 2-dimensional case, which allows for 
considerable simplification. As a simple corollary we have: 
Corollary 7.3.2 Let (X1.X2) be generalized hyperbolic gh2(>.,J.L,tl.,x.,'I/J). Then the 
conditional distribution of x2 given xl is ghl (>.- 1/2, jL, 1, x, ti;) where 
a12 
J.L = J.L2 +(xi- J.LI)x-, 
11 
x X. (xi - J.L1? x- + f12 ' 11 11 
'1/J = '1/Jtl.u. 
Finally, we remark that the formulation of the hyperbolic distribution as a normal variance 
mixture allows for an easy way to simulate from ghd(>., J.L, tl., x., '1/J). Let E = utl.. The 
simulation algorithm is as follows: 
1. Generate u from GIG(>.,x.,'I/J). 
2. Return Y = J.L + A'v, 
where A' A = E via Cholesky decomposition and v is Nd(O, Id) independent of u. 
Thus the problem effectively reduces to a one-dimensional problem, namely that 
of simulating from a generalized inverse Gaussian random variable. Here this is 
achieved by using the R function rgig downloaded from Professor David Scott 's website 
(http:/ Jwww.stat.auckland.ac.nz/ "'dscottj). 
7.3.2 Financial application 
·As a financial application we consider the contagion problem associated with Latin 
America. In particular, the period encapsulates the Mexican crisis in 1994 and a crisis 
in Argentina that started in 2001. {71}, Chapter 6, look at daily log-returns from 
four national stock markets: Argentina (Merval index), Brazil (IBOV index), Chile 
(IPSA index) and Mexico (Mexbol index). The sample period covers January 15th 
1992 to 15th June 2002, and thus includes both crisis periods. Malevergne and Sornette 
conclude in favour of an asymmetric contagion effect, whereby Mexico and Chile can be 
potential sources of contagion towards Argentina and Brazil, but the reverse does not hold. 
According to Malevergne and Sornette this offers an attractive economic interpretation 
in terms of market-oriented and state-intervention oriented countries. The hypothesis 
is that currency floating regimes are able to adapt to important manufacturing sectors 
and deliver more competitive real exchange rates (Chile and Mexico) than fixed exchange 
rates (Argentina before the 2001 crisis, and Brazil). In short, a more flexible exchange 
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rate might be seen to provide a safety net and allow a decoupling between the national 
stock market and external influences. 
Here, we look at daily log-returns from the Mexican IPC index and the Brazilian Bovespa 
index, from May 3rd 1993 to April 30th 2003. Whilst Malevergne and Sornette use a 
bivariate student-t distribution, we use the bivariate generalized hyperbolic distribution. 
For our results to be consistent with the analysis of Malevergne and Sornette we should 
see that the IPC affects the Bovespa but the Bovespa does not affect the IPC. Here we 
measure "affect" in terms of deviation from the sampling distribution of the correlation 
measures under the null hypothesis that the log price follows a symmetric 2-d generalized 
hyperbolic random walk. The results are shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. In the sequel 
the graphs have the following structure. The X axis denotes x-values, standardised 
by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The Y -values denote 
conditional correlation or conditional Spearman's p values. For X-values less than zero we 
calculate p-(v) or p;(v). Thus we are conditioning on values of y when the X takes values 
less than or equal to x. For X-values greater than zero we calculate p+(v) or Pt(v). Thus 
we are conditioning on values of y when the X takes values greater than or equal to x. 
The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence regions- obtained by Monte Carlo simulation 
- under the null hypothesis that the log-prices follow a symmetric bivariate generalized 
hyperbolic random walk. 
Further details of the Monte Carlo algorithm are as follows. Note that under the null 
hypothesis of a random walk, the log-returns constitute a random sample from a bivariate 
generalized hyperbolic distribution. Let X and Y refer to the two time series of log-
returns. First we consider the observed values Xi of X, and simulate Yi,s from the 
distribution of YiiXi = Xi using Corollary 7.3.2 for the conditional distributions of the 
2-d symmetric generalized hyperbolic distribution. From this (xi, Yi,s)pseudosample, we 
calculate p- (xi) and p;(xi) or p+(xi) and Pt(xi) for each Xi, depending on whether 
or not Xi > f.lX· We repeat this procedure 10,000 times to generate pointwise 95% 
confidence intervals. 
7 .3.3 Empirical results 
The results for the Mexican IPC conditional on the Brazilian Bovespa are shown in Figure 
7.1. The results for the Brazilian Bovespa conditional on the Mexican IPC are shown in 
Figure 7.2. In Figure 7.1 the observed sample conditional correlation coefficient lies within 
confidence limits. The conditional Spearman's rho shows some minor deviation from this 
null hypothesis, although it seems rather grand to label this contagion. Thus, we seem to 
have some suggestion of really quite minor contamination from Brazil to Mexico. 
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In contrast, we seem to have stronger evidence for a contagion effect from Mexico affecting 
Brazil. This is shown most strongly by the conditional Spearman's rho statistic, although 
this is also highlighted by the conditional linear correlation coefficient in the left panel. We 
note from the scale of the x-axis in the plots that we appear to have roughly twice as much 
contagion from Mexico to Brazil using the conditional correlation measure as from Brazil 
to Mexico using the conditional Spearman's rho statistic. The conditional Spearman's 
rho statistic then shows an added degree of contamination from Mexico to Brazil than 
that measured by the conditional correlation measure. The results thus appear to be in 
agreement with Malevergne and Sornette's analysis. There seems to be an asymmetric 
contagion effect whereby Mexico affects Brazil but there is a comparatively minor influence 
in the opposite direction. 
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Figure 7.1: Left panel: Values of p±(v) Right panel: Values of Pt'(v) 
7.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed a statistical approach to evaluating contagion in economics 
based on conditional concordance measures and the null hypothesis of a heavy-tailed 
random walk. Here we used a 2-d symmetric generalized hyperbolic random walk. 
Appropriate mathematical and statistical background was discussed and, in particular, 
copulae were introduced as the appropriate way to describe the probabilistic eo-evolution 
ofmultivariate random variables. Further, as an alternative to the simple linear correlation 
coefficient, Spearman's rho was introduced and, as presented in {77} and {71}, was shown 
to be a direct functional of the underlying copula. Two conditional concordance measures 
were discussed, the conditional correlation coefficient and the conditional Spearman's 
rho. The conditional Spearman 's rho appears to be the more sensitive measure of eo-
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Figure 7.2: Left panel: Values of p±(v) Right panel: Values of p:;(v) 
dependence, with results using this measure showing greater deviation from the null 
hypothesis of a random walk. However, results using both measures showed some 
similarities. In terms of the financial application, we have evidence for contagion from 
Mexico to Brazil but a relatively minor influence in the opposite direction. These results 
coincide with the interpretation of {71} and may admit the economic interpretation that 
currency floating regimes provide greater protection from external influences than fixed 
exchange rate regimes. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and further work 
8.1 Conclusions 
We can summarise the main conclusions of this thesis as follows. In Chapters 1-3 we 
analysed financial data corresponding to the S&P 500, the N asdaq and the Hang Seng prior 
to observed crashes. In Chapter 1 we reviewed the log-periodic method of Sornette and 
Johansen. In Chapter 2 we were able to show that simple random variation can generate 
an apparent log-periodic signal. Further, rather than log-periodicity, it appears sufficient 
to model super-exponential growth. A definite precursor of crashes appears to be super-
exponential growth, with the price continuing to accelerate before the observed crashes. In 
Chapter 2 we combined these simple observations with the interpretation of [84}, namely 
that bubble episodes may involve rational investors appropriately compensated for added 
levels of risk. Mathematically, we use a slightly simplified version of the JLS power-law 
with interest rate [52}. The resulting formulae are intuitive and lead to bubbles exhibiting 
super-exponential growth. We call this model the SEG model. We then use this model to 
obtain interesting backward predictions for these historically observed crashes. 
In Chapter 3 we studied SDE models for bubbles. First we examined a proposed hierarchy, 
{2}, of no bubbles vs. fearless bubbles vs. fearful bubbles. However, the proposed fearless 
bubble model, an SDE formulation of the JLS power-law model, is not seen to offer 
a significant improvement over geometric Brownian motion. In contrast, the proposed 
fearful bubble model is seen to offer a significant improvement. We made two identifiability 
constraints and derived maximum likelihood equations for the Sornette-Andersen model 
[94} to refine the statistical analysis of [2} with a likelihood-ratio test for the presence of 
bubbles. These results are also interesting as they demonstrate that SDEs a flexible and 
natural tool to use in this context and form the natural and meaningful generalisation of 
the super-exponential growth ODE models considered previously. 
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Further, the original formulation of the Sornette-Andersen model can be improved by 
using a heavy-tailed hyperbolic Levy process, {34}, in order to take into account non-
Gaussian behaviour in financial markets ( {31}, Chapter 7 page 210). The likelihood ratio 
test still applies and gives us a more robust test for bubbles in financial markets. The 
results using the hyperbolic re-formulation are seen to be generally less significant than 
when the background driving noise process is assumed to be Brownian motion. We use 
this test to repeat the analysis of {2] and also in out-of-sample analysis in Chapter 5 as 
we compare our model with some of the analysis in {93}. 
In Chapter 4 we discuss volatility and liquidity precursors. Liquidity is a general concept 
from economics, it refers to the unrestricted flow of money in "healthy" markets and 
generalises the purely statistical notion of volatility. We developed a simple test, based on 
the Sornette-Andersen model, to gauge which factors were significant once we account for 
super-exponential growth. Results are seen to offer an improvement over a simple nonlinear 
regression approach using ordinary least squares, since in this case the error terms appear 
to be very highly correlated. We have some evidence to support the interpretation of [22} 
that crashes occur on volatile, illiquid markets. Further, the economic interpretation of 
these results seems interesting, with different features seen to be significant on each of 
the three markets. The JLS power-law model makes explicit the analogy between stock 
market crashes and complex systems. In particular, this model assumes that economic 
variables display power-laws and approximate phase-transition behaviour prior to crashes. 
Our statistical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 gives some evidence in support of this 
and liquidity measures closely linked to the trading volume seem particularly important. 
Hence, we also find some additional evidence to support the analogy between stock market 
crashes and complex systems. 
In Chapter 5 we synthesise material in Chapters 2-4. In particular, our method follows the 
heuristic given by Figure 5.1, using the likelihood ratio test of the hyperbolic Sornette-
Andersen model as a formal statistical test for super-exponential growth. We test for 
bubbles using four-years of data as suggested by the results of our backwards predictions 
using the SEG model in Chapter 2. In Section 1 we find evidence of a bubble in the 
US$:DEM series from February 1981- February 1985 but reject the hypothesis of a bubble 
in the US$:CAD series July 1994-July 1998. Both are cited as bubbles in {93}. In Section 
2 we discuss log-periodic false predictions as discussed in {93}. In both cases we find strong 
evidence for bubbles, but find that the original method seems to over-state the extent to 
which a crash is imminent. The second prediction is of a crash on the Nasdaq in Oct. 1999 
based on data up to the end of Sept. 1999. Using both our SEG model of Chapter 2 and 
theregime-switching regression model of {103} we conclude that in actual fact, the level of 
risk seems to peak around 2000, the actual time of the crash and around six months later 
than the original prediction. Section 4 illustrates the prediction heuristic Figure 5.1, and 
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we are able to obtain interesting results corresponding to historical crashes using data for 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average Sept. 1983-Sept. 1987 and for the Nasdaq 100 index 
from March 1996-March 2000. 
In Chapter 6 we extended the approach taken in [55} to derive an approximate generalised 
Pareto distribution for drawdowns on an exponential-Levy market. This result refutes the 
previous suggestion in [55} that large drawdowns are outliers. The result obtained appears 
to have possible applications for calibrating Levy process models of financial markets and 
capital allocation problems in banks. Also in Chapter 6 we discussed the method of [100} 
for determining the origin of crises. The theory states that crises with an exogenous 
origin should involve a faster volatility decay than crises with a more involved endogenous 
origin, with an approximate power-law decay in volatility in both cases. This is based 
on an analogy between stock markets and simple models for exogenous and endogenous 
shocks in complex systems [95}. From the results obtained we observed at least some 
empirical results to support the intuition of [100}. However, it appears that this method 
is flawed in that it systematically fails to estimate the empirically observed exponents for 
"endogenous" shocks, and also is not able to predict values for the exponent corresponding 
to endogenous shocks. It appears that rather than the multifractal random walk, a better 
match with empirical data can be found with a stochastic volatility model where the log-
volatility obeys a fractional Gaussian noise process. FUrther, this simple model is able 
to predict the exponent of the power law decay corresponding to an "endogenous" shock, 
with a reasonable correspondence with the empirical data. 
According to the economic literature on currency and banking crises there is a subtle 
distinction between insurance crisis and illiquidity crisis models [6}. The class of illiquidity 
crises models motivates the question of evaluating contagion in economics. Following 
the approach of [71}, we formulate this question as "Is there any evidence of contagion 
over and above that which we might expect under the null hypothesis of a symmetric 
generalized hyperbolic random walk?". The financial application was with regard to the 
Latin American currency crises of the 1990s and Brazil and Mexico in particular. The 
results obtained were consistent with the conclusions of [71}, Chapter 6, and appear to 
show an asymmetric contagion effect whereby Mexico infects Brazil but not vice-versa. It 
has been suggested that this is consistent with the economic interpretation that currency 
floating regimes provide greater protection from external influences than fixed exchange 
rate regimes. 
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8.2 Further work 
There are rich potential avenues for empirical application of ideas expressed in this thesis. 
This includes use of the SEG bubble models in Chapters 2-5, the empirical power-Jaws in 
Chapters 4 and 5, and the work in evaluating contagion in economics in Chapter 7. In 
particular, the empirical power-laws in Chapter 4 and 5 are of interest as they highlight, 
quantitatively, the analogy between stock markets crashes and complex systems. The 
implicit assumption is that this feature should be very general and not a specific artefact 
of the limited number of markets examined in this thesis. Possible avenue for further 
investigation include models for time-varying expectations and models for change-points 
in financial series. Change-point models are discussed in [60}. 
There are also a number of possible ways in which one might consider improvements to 
models considered here. One might consider extending the SEG model of Chapter 2 using 
a regime-switching framework or by a Bayesian formulation of the problem. {28] consider 
a Bayesian formulation of log-periodic models using the exact definition of the hazard rate 
(see Appendix A). 
Chapter 3 suggests ways in which theoretical models may be developed. For the Sornette-
Andersen model we may not only wish to consider option pricing problems but also 
extensions to the model itself. Here, we replaced the background noise process with a non-
Gaussian hyperbolic Levy process. However, the Sornette-Andersen model was initially 
constructed as a nonlinear generalisation of the Black-Scholes model and one might equally 
consider nonlinear generalisations of simple stochastic volatility models. 
The derived formula for drawdowns suggest possible applications for calibration of Levy 
models and risk management. It might be of interest to develop a more rigorous 
mathematical analysis and investigate ways in which similar power-law behaviour might 
emerge in complex systems. Tail behaviour under random stopping is briefly discussed 
in [17], Chapter 8. The method of {100} is interesting and probably has a very broad 
potential application to a wide range of areas. However, in Chapter 6 it appears that 
rather than the multifractal random walk a better description of the empirical data is 
given by a stochastic volatility model where the log-volaility obeys a fractional Gaussian 
noise process [95}. Analysis and estimation of this model would be interesting. Further, 
the causal integral representation {6.29) is a key feature of interest here. In particular, 
one might examine the subject of volatility precursors of financial crashes if it is assumed, 
as in the JLS model, that markets price risks of the form B(tc- t)-a prior to crashes. 
It may also be of interest to consider valuation models and ways of constructing 
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fundamental prices. Simple valuation models include the constant fundamental price-
dividend ratio model described in the appendix of {103] and vector autoregressive 
techniques, for example [25]. One particular problem is that in the first case the price-
dividend ratio is assumed constant, and in the second case is assumed constant subject 
to short term variations regarding future dividend payments. Empirical results using 
both these methods are seen to be broadly similar {23], {103]. However, are these 
modelling assumptions realistic when the price dividend ratio is seen to increase over time, 
particularly in recent years? Some simple present value models are discussed in Chapter 
7 of [26]. One suggestion is that markets might be adjusting to high anticipated earnings 
associated with new technologies which are yet to deliver. A paper discussing some of 
these issues is {91]. Another possibility might be a Bayesian formulation of the pricing 
problem, where the price-dividend ratio p and other model parameters are considered to 
be unknown random variables which have to be estimated by a representative market 
agent. For an application of these ideas to a slightly different context see [51}. 
There are also a number of less obvious ways in which one might consider extending this 
thesis. Given the close analogies between stock markets and complex systems described 
in Chapters 1-5 one might consider other ways in which this could be explicitly accounted 
for in the modelling. In Chapter 7, it may be of interest to extend our purely statistical 
approach by considering stochastic epidemic models. However, it is not obvious how this 
may be achieved in a manner which retains the practical nature of the existing method. 
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Appendix A 
Exact definition of the hazard rate 
Chapter 2 discussed the hazard-rate in relation to a first-order martingale approximation 
in the JLS power-law model. Here, for the sake of completeness we list the exact 
interpretation of the hazard rate as discussed in the appendix of [28}. Suppose that 
a crash has not occurred by time t1. The conditional probability that X will occur at or 
before time t2, (t2 > ti), is given by 
(A.1) 
where F denotes the cdf of X. The hazard rate is obtained by taking 
h(ti) = (d~2 Pr(X$t2IX > ti)) . 
t2=tl 
Let S(t) = 1 - F(t). Then S'(t) = - f(t) and we have that 
-S'(t) -d 
h(t) = S(i) = dt ln{S(t)), 
and S(O) = 1. Continuing, we see that S(t) = exp{- J~ h(u)du} and {A.1) reduces to 
= 
S(ti) - S(t2) 
S(ti) 
= 1 _ S(t2) S(ti)' 
1- exp{-1t
2 
h(u)du}. 
tl 
{A.2) 
Thus (A.2) is the exact conditional probability statement corresponding to the hazard rate 
h(t). 
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Appendix B 
Derivation of the van 
Norden-Schaller model 
This model requires a decomposition of a stock price into a bubble component and a 
fundamental price component. We now describe a very simple way how this approximate 
decomposition might be achieved before we give a full derivation of the model. 
B.O.l Constructing fundamental values 
This subsection describes a simple model to estimate fundamental values. This approach 
is considered by both [103} and {23}, and is the simplest way to construct fundamental 
values. Here, we interpret fundamental values as price levels that would appear reasonable 
given observed dividend payments. Both papers also consider a more complicated vector 
autoregressive method, described in [25}, to achieve this fundamental value-bubble 
decomposition. However, both these papers report that results seem to be similar for these 
two methods. According to the appendix in [103}, the starting point is the equilibrium 
condition in the [69} model for economy-wide market prices and quantities: 
(B.l) 
where U' ( ·) denotes the derivative of a utility function relating to consumption of dividends 
and Pt, Dt are the price at timet and Et corresponds to the conditional expectation with 
respect to some filtration Ft. /3 denotes a subjective discount factor 0 < /3 < 1. Next, this 
simple model assumes, for sake of tractability, a constant relative risk aversion utility: 
{B.2) 
where 'Y is the coefficient ofrelative risk aversion. Substituting (B.2) into (B.l) gives us 
{B.3) 
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This model then assumes, for sake of tractability, that log dividends are a random walk 
with drift, so that letting dt = log(Dt) we have 
dt = ao + dt-1 + £t, (B.4) 
where ao is a drift parameter, and €t is an i.i.d. sequence of N(O, a 2) random variables. 
To solve this model, we propose a solution of the form 
(B.5) 
Plugging (B.5) into (B.3), we obtain 
(B.6) 
2 2 
From (B.4) and using the fact that the moment generating function of N(j.L, a2 ) is eJJt+T 
we have that 
(B.7) 
which follows from the fact that dt+lldt is N(ao + dt, a 2). Plugging (B.7) into (B.6) we 
are left with 
i.e. p = 
j3eao(1+-y)+ (l+·r:t"'2 
2 2 • 
1 - /1eao(1+-r)+ (l+J} " 
(B.8) 
Hence, it follows that (B.5) holds with p given by (B.8). The implications are that under 
this simple model, the fundamental value Pt' is simply tied to the dividend as: 
Pt = pDt. 
In empirical work, p is estimated by the mean price-dividend ratio. 
B.0.2 A Regime-Switching Regression model 
We use the simple model of the previous subsection to construct fundamental prices. Let 
Pt denote the stock market price at time t, and Bt be the deviation from fundamental 
price defined as Bt = Pt- Pt', where Pt is the fundamental price Pt' = pDt. We have 
two states S a speculative regime with a bubble and C a collapsing bubble regime. The 
transition between the state S and the state C corresponds to a crash. Assuming that Bt 
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is statistically independent of Dt, we have that if the equilibrium condition is satisfied 
(B.9) 
This can be seen as follows. The equilibrium condition in (B.l) is 
(B.lO) 
The LHS in (B.10) becomes 
using Bt = Pt - Pt. Similarly, the RHS in (B.10) becomes 
/3Et(Dl+t (Bt+l + pDt+t + Dt+t)) = /3Et(DJ+IBt+t) + /3Et((1 + p)DJtl), 
= /3Et(DJ+1Bt+t) + pD:+-r, 
from (B.6). Finally, (B.9) follows from the assumption that the Bt and the Dt are 
independent. If we retain the assumption that dt = log(Dt) = o:o + dt-1 + tt, where 
the t:t are i.i.d. N(O, u2), then (B.9) can be re-written as 
Et[Bt+I] D-r 
= 
t 
Bt !3Et!DJ+l]' 
= 
/3-1 e --y(ao+-ra2 /2}, 
= M, (B.ll) 
for some constant M say, using the fact that the moment generating function of N (J.L, u2 ) 
is e~'t+a2t2 12 • Let bt = Bt/ Pt be the relative bubble size at time t and consider the state 
S. If we are in state S at timet, the probability of being in Sat time t + 1 is given by 
q = q(bt), so that the probability of remaining in state S at time t + 1 depends on the 
relative bubble size. Further q( ·) is assumed to satisfy 
dq(bt) 0 
dlbt I < ' (B.12) 
so that as the relative bubble size increases, a collapse becomes more likely. Consider the 
state C. In the collapsing regime C, bt+l is expected to increase less than proportionately 
with bt. To incorporate this van Norden and Schaller define 
(B.13) 
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where u(·) is a continuous and everywhere differentiable function satisfying u(O) = 0 and 
O~u'~l. This means that 
< 1. 
In order to retain (B.ll), we must have 
(B.l4) 
Let Rt+l denote the returns given by Rt+l = PttlttDttl = Pt±1 +Dttl ~~Ptti-Pt+ 1 ). It follows 
that 
Using the definition of fundamental price, it follows that 
= 
From (B.15), it follows that 
Et[(l + p)Dt+l] 
Pt 
Dt ( 1 + P )eato+u2 /2 
Pt 
(B.15) 
(B.16) 
since bt = *· Now Pt- Bt = Pt = pDt. So~= l~bt. Inserting this into (B.16) gives 
E [R IS]= (1 + p) ato+u2f2(1 _b)+ Mbt _ (1- q(bt))u(bt) 
t t+l p e t q(bt) q(bt) . (B.17) 
Similarly, E[Rt+liCJ now becomes 
= (1 + P) eato+u2f2(I _ bt) + E[Bt+1ICJ 
P Pt ' 
= (1 + p) eato+u2f2(I- bt) + u(bt). 
p (B.18) 
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Since the previous expressions are all differentiable functions of bt, a first-order linear 
approximation 1 enables us to write 
E(Rt+liS) = f3so + f3sbbt, 
E(Rt+dC) = f3co + f3cbbt, 
qt+l = {3qO + f3qblbtl· (B.I9) 
This simple linear approximation enables us to say something about the coefficients in the 
model (B.I9). We have 
dEt[Rt+tiC] _ -(I+ p) O<o+o-2/2 '(b) 
db - e +u t. t p (B.20) 
Since, by assumption, u'(bt):::;I, in the financially reasonable case that a 0 > 0 
(corresponding to dividends that tend to grow over time), it follows that (B.20) must 
be negative, and hence that the coefficient f3cb < 0 in (B.I9). By construction, we must 
also have {3qb < 0. We also have 
bt=bo 
= -(I+ p) e0<o+u2;2 + _!!__ _ Mbtq'(bo) _ u'(bo) (I- q(bo)) + q'(bo)u(bo) 
P q(bo) q(bo)2 q(bo) q2(bo) ' 
= dEt[Rt+liC] +_I_ [M_ u'(b )) + q'(bo) [ (bo) _ Mbo] 
dbt q(bo) 0 q2(bo) u ' 
bt=bo 
I 1 i(bo) 
= f3cb + q(bo) [M-u (bo)] + q(bo)2 [u(bo)- Mbo]. 
Under the financially reasonable assumption that M > I, so that the rate of return on 
the fundamental is positive, the second term in (B.2I) must be positive since u'(bo) < I 
by assumption. Next we consider the third term in (B.2I). By assumption, q'(bt) < 0 for 
bt > 0 and q'(bt) > 0 for bt < 0. We also have that [u(bt)- Mbt]' = [u'(bt)- M], which is 
negative by the above, and in this case means that [u(bt)- Mbt] is a strictly decreasing 
function of bt. We also have u(O) = 0 (by assumption), meaning that [u(bt) - Mbt] is 
positive for bt < 0, and negative for bt > 0. These considerations imply that the final term 
in (B.2I) is also non-negative, and we are left with f3sb > f3cb, which is intuitive as this 
suggests higher returns when in the speculative phase. As a purely statistical formulation 
of the model, {103} use 
Rt+1IS = f3so + f3sbbt + ES,t+l. 
Rt+ tiC f3co + f3cbbt + EC,t+l, 
Qt+1 = 4?({3qO + {3qblbtl), 
1corresponding to f(bt)-;::J(bo) + /'(bo)(bt- bo) 
Ill 
(B.22) 
(B.2I) 
where 4>(·) denotes the standard normal CDF. This specification then ensures that the 
estimated q-values lie in [0, 1]. The tS,t+l and tC,t+l are assumed to be independent 
sequences of normal white-noise errors with variances u~ and ub respectively. 
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Appendix C 
Market-value models for banking 
• crises 
Models in this section make the fundamental assumption that the health of banking 
sectors (and of companies more generally) can be distilled from publicly available market 
prices. Typically, fairly general tools from mathematical finance are used with the aim 
of producing estimates of either distance to default or probability of default. These are 
used as suitable proxies which may be used to measure or predict crises. For illustration, 
we describe two approaches here. The first model used by {27} uses an option pricing 
approach, close in spirit to the seminal paper of {78}, to estimate distance to default. A 
second method, based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, is used by {24} to construct 
estimates of the probability of default. 
C.l Merton 's model 
The asset value of the firm V is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion with drift 
equal to the risk-free interest rate r and volatility u: 
dVi = Vi(rdt + udWt), (C.l) 
where W is a standard Brownian motion. The firm defaults when its asset value at 
maturity Vr is less than or equal to its debt at maturity D. We introduce the distance to 
default d as a measure of default risk. From !to's rule, we have 
u2 
d = log(Vr) -log( D)= log(Vo) + (r- 2T + uWr -log( D)), 
using the fact that in the Black-Scholes modellog(Vr )"'N (log(Vo) + ( r- ~2 )T, u2T) with 
Wr-N(O, T). The normalized distance-to-default DD- which is more commonly used in 
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practice - is defined as 
2 
DD = _d _ _ _ W_r = _lo..;;...g..:....(Vr_;o/:..._D_;):..._+-::::::-( r--~~.....,;)_T 
u..JT ..JT u..JT 
This renormalised distance to default DD is given by~ (where /1-d and rJd denote the mean 
and standard deviation of d) and is thus a measure of the number of standard deviations 
a firm is from default. Calculating the distance-to-default requires knowledge of the asset 
value and the asset volatility of the firm. However, if the face value of debt D and the 
maturity T are known, then the two unobservable variables can be calculated from the 
firm's equity value E and its volatility U£. These latter two variables can be measured 
empirically as functions of the asset value of the firm. Under Merton's model, the distance 
to default DD can be estimated from a series of nonlinear equations. 
The value of the firm's equity at maturity T is given by 
Er = max(Vr- D, 0). 
From this we see that the equity is equivalent to a European call option on the price with 
maturity T and strike D. Thus, starting at time t and maturing T periods later, the 
European call option formula gives 
(C.2) 
vt and Dt denote the company value and the value of debt at timet, ~(·) is the N(O, 1) 
c.d.f. and d1 and d2 are defined as 
log (-H;) + (r + ~)T 
d1 = u..JT 
d2 = d1- uvT. 
(C.3) 
(C.4) 
Now equity is a function of asset value. Thus we can use !to's lemma to calculate the 
instantaneous equity volatility UE,t· Suppose that Xt follows an Ito process of the form 
with instantaneous volatility given by u(Xt, t). It follows from Ito's formula that the 
process yt = G(Xt, t) has an instantaneous volatility defined by Ytu(yt, t) = Rf;Xtu(Xt. t). 
From this result we can see from (C.2) that we must have 
(C.5) 
where UE t denotes the instantaneous equity volatility. This result can be seen as follows. 
' 
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From (C.2) we have that 
Completing the square, we can see that 
We have from (C.3-C.4) that 
= 
2 (log (-b;) + rT) 
av'T 
= aVT. 
Combining, we see that 
from which it follows that 
Chan-Lau et al. use T = 1 year, the 1-year U.S. treasury yield as the proxy for the risk-
free interest rate, and calculate equity volatility from the three-month moving average 
from daily equity data. The value of debt Dt at time t is interpolated from annual stock 
debt estimates. The set of nonlinear equations (C.2-C.5) can then be used to estimate the 
distance to default DD. 
C.2 CAPM-based modelling approach 
The model here is that given in used originally in [49} for individual banks, and by {24} 
to represent a particular country's banking sector. A representative bank has both assets 
and liabilities, and if we assume that these claims are all priced efficiently by the market, 
then the stock price St of the bank is given by 
where N is the number of stocks, Pit is the price of the bank's asset or liability i at time 
t, and Xit is the amount of the asset/liability at time t. We assume that the expected 
value of the stock in the future in conjunction with the variability of the underlying 
115 
value around this expectation is informative about the probability of the bank actually 
defaulting. Conditional upon information available up to and including time t - 1, the 
CAPM expresses the expected return of a stock, Et-l(Rt), as the the sum of a risk-free 
return RFt (for example a treasury bill) plus a time-varying risk premium RPt: 
(C.6) 
The risk premium can be thought of as representing the amount of risk that an investor 
has to be compensated for multiplied by the market price of this risk At. According to 
the CAPM not all risk can be compensated for, and in equilibrium only non-diversifiable 
risk is priced. Thus, only non-diversifiable risk should be compensated for in the market 
by a higher return than the risk free return. If we denote the amount of expected non-
diversifiable risk by Et-I(NDt) we can write 
(C.7) 
where the €t is a zero-mean stochastic error term. From (C.6) and (C.7) we can see that 
the value of the bank capital at time t can be calculated as 
(C.8) 
(C.8) can be decomposed into the sum of a deterministic average and a stochastic error 
term: 
(C.9) 
where the conditional mean is given by the sum of the first three terms in (C.8). The 
conditional variance is given by (St-1N)2u~t' where uEt denotes the time-varying standard 
deviation of the innovations €t· Under the assumption of market efficiency, so that the 
time series StN is a martingale, we can divide the the value of the bank St-lN by the 
conditional standard deviation Bt-1 N r7 Et to obtain 
(C.lO) 
We see from (C.9) that (C.lO) as a ratio of a conditional mean and a conditional standard 
deviation is a distance to default measure, giving the number of standard deviations that 
the bank is away from default (if we assume that default occurs when the value of the bank 
becomes negative). (C.lO) can also be used to directly calculate probabilities of default 
under the assumption that €t is normal. In this case the probability of default at time t 
can be calculated as 
(C.ll) 
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which is the probability that (C.9) becomes negative. We return to the definition of the 
CAPM model in order to show how we may obtain estimates of <Jw According to CAPM, 
see for example [24}, the expected returns can be written as 
where RMt is the return on the market portfolio and f3t is the expected conditional CAPM 
coefficient defined as 
where <JRt,RMt = Cov(Rt, RMt) and <7hMt = Var(RMt). Since the variance of the market 
portfolio corresponds to the amount of non-diversifiable risk, it follows from (C. 7) that 
We can rearrange this formula to provide an expression for the market price of risk: 
since the risk free return RFt is regarded as non-stochastic. Rewriting (C.7) for the market 
portfolio we see that 
(C.12) 
where Vt is a zero-mean random error term. Finally using the definition of the CAPM 
coefficient f3t we can see that the returns of the representative bank are given by 
Rt = RF. Et-1 (<JRt,RMt)Et-1 (RMt - RFt) t + E ( 2 ) + ft 
t-1 qRMt 
= RFt + AtEt-1(<7Rt,RMt) + ft, 
= RFt + AtEt-1(qEt,vt) + ft. (C.13) 
In sum, (C.12) and (C.13) give equations for time-varying expectations of variances and 
covariances which depend the time series behaviour of ft and Vt· For parsimony Bystrom 
uses a bivariate Garch-M (1, 1) process which allows for changes in the conditional mean 
to occur alongside changes in conditional variances and co-variances. [24] uses FTSE-All-
World banking sector indices and FTSE-ALL World country indices to represent Rt and 
RMt respectively, before using (C.ll) to estimate default probabilities. We refer to [24] 
for full details. 
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